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ABSTRACT
CENTRAL AMERICAN REFUGEES IN COSTA RICA
by
Anna M. Alejo
The conflicts of the past decade in Central America have produced
substantial refugee movements into neighboring nations. Costa Rica has had to
cope with an influx of refugees and migrants as large as 10 percent of its
population. This work presents a case study of the situation in Costa Rica,
focusing on the issue of refugee integration into the host society. It draws on
qualitative field research conducted in that country during 1986.
The study discusses the evolution of the Costa Rican state's response to the
refugee crisis and analyzes the characteristics and impact of policies undertaken
by various state bureaucracies. It also describes the assistance efforts of the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and private voluntary
organizations, along with their interaction with the Costa Rican state. The study
concludes that the government's need to maintain firm control of refugee
programs has overshadowed its commitment to refugee integration. In so doing,
the humanitarian purpose of refugee assistance has been compromised.
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1Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
In recent years, Costa Rica has experienced a massive influx of Central
American refugees who have relatively low levels of education and skills. At
mid-1986 the government registered close to 30,000, but estimated that an
additional 150,000 to 250,000 Central Americans (mostly Nicaraguans) were in
the country without documentation.' Combined, these numbers could equal 10
percent of Costa Rica's 2.5 million people, a substantial impact on a small
developing country.
These refugees are among the 2 million persons who have been displaced
by the conflict in Central America. Many have fled to neighboring nations on
the isthmus where they are straining scarce resources. Costa Ricans are alarmed
by the influx of foreigners into their country and fear that its stability is being
threatened.
Most of the debate on the refugees and migrants has focused on emergency
and relief efforts.2 The long-term nature of the crises these people flee, however,
poses the problem of whether and how they may be effectively incorporated into
Costa Rican society. The objective of this work is to assess the prospects and
obstacles for refugee integration in Costa Rica, based on an analysis of official
and private assistance programs for Central American refugees during the period
1980-86.
2REFUGEES AND HOST COUNTRIES:
ENDURING DILEMMAS
Refugee flows are increasingly affecting governments around the world.
While today's estimated 13 million refugees do not surpass the number of people
who were displaced during World War II, they present much greater problems.
International attention toward some 22 million persons displaced during World
War H focused on population movements originating in Europe.' Major refugee
movements now occur in the less developed regions of Asia, Africa, and Latin
America.
The plight of refugees is compounded by the existence of an unprecedented
number of illegal migrants. Flows of labor across national boundaries have been
the natural outcome of an international economic system. Unskilled workers and
individuals seeking to rejoin family members constitute a large part of the
world's illegal or undocumented migrants. Receiving states face the dilemma of
distinguishing between refugees and migrants while also protecting themselves
from uncontrolled immigration.4
The concept of "refugee" has become more complex, as have the conflicts
that refugees leave behind. Some refugees flee individual persecution based on
ethnicity, religion, or political activity, but others flee generalized conditions of
poverty and oppression. Protracted violence and revolutionary wars spurred by
severe social inequalities have caused massive outflows from some Third World
countries.
3Unlike those dislocated by earlier conflicts in the Third World -- such as
the wars between Muslims and Hindus after the partition of India in 1947 --
many of today's refugees may never return to their home countries.' Voluntary
repatriation may be the most desirable solution to refugee situations, but it is
often the least practical. As the Central American case illustrates, civil strife or
warfare could continue indefinitely, requiring more than just temporary assistance
for those who seek refuge.
Few refugees can resettle in industrialized third countries. The majority of
today's refugees remain in Third World countries of first asylum, where they
impose burdens on already strained resources. In many developing countries
there is an absence or weakness of effective political institutions. Infrastructure
is fragile and economic outputs can hardly keep up with growing populations,
leaving little surplus for emergencies.
A nation's refugee policy results from a complex interplay of domestic and
international factors. The policymaking process reveals the delicate issue of
balancing state rights against individual rights.' Adherence to international
treaties on refugees obliges states to limit their "customary rights to decide the
terms of entry and sojourn of individuals."'
Any country -- developed or underdeveloped -- is likely to encounter a
surge of nationalism or xenophobia if it experiences an enormous influx of
foreigners. Fearful statements by citizens or lawmakers that their country is
being "overrun by aliens" or is "losing control of its borders" could easily be
found in the United States or Honduras. Hostile popular attitudes toward
4refugees -- and especially toward undocumented migrants -- are prevalent in
many countries."
Although refugees have often been integrated successfully and made
valuable contributions to host countries, they tend to be viewed as liabilities,
particularly when they arrive in large numbers. The special circumstances of
refugees are often not understood by the general public; refugees are viewed as
ordinary immigrants.' Like ordinary immigrants, refugees are easy targets for
anxieties about rising unemployment rates, depressed wages, strained public
services, and changing cultural values. Such arguments are recurrent and usually
are not deterred by lack of evidence.10
It is inevitable, then, that refugee policies become politicized, reflecting
domestic and foreign political interests as opposed to humanitarian concerns."
This occurs in varying degrees depending on the nature of the host state and the
refugee influx.
In the past, foreign policy considerations have shaped United States refugee
policy. These factors accounted in part for generosity towards refugees during
World War II, and later, toward those fleeing communist countries. Such
interests have been seen most recently in the different treatment accorded Cuban
and Haitian refugees.
Once refugees and migrants have gained entrance into the United States --
either by legal or illegal means -- they are guaranteed constitutional rights to due
process and equal protection. The desire to extend social programs to all who
live in the United States can be seen in a recent ruling by the Supreme Court,
5which holds that all children of undocumented workers have the right to attend
public schools without paying additional fees. 2
There is a wealth of literature on the experiences of immigrants in
developed countries. The older writings on "assimilation" assumed that all
immigrants -- if given enough time -- would eventually become economically
successful and accepted by the majority in a receiving country. 3 The newer
"adaptation" theory of migration abandons the idea of a "melting pot" and does
not assume that the immigrant becomes integrated into the host society. Instead,
it focuses on the process by which individuals come to establish themselves in a
set of roles in a new society as a function of variables controlled by the
immigrant, such as ethnicity, education and skills; and variables imposed on the
immigrant by the receiving society, such as job opportunities and government
initiatives in promoting integration."
The United States and other Western countries are leading contributors to
the international refugee assistance system. This aid is intended to lessen the
impact of refugees on first asylum countries. Despite this generosity, there has
been a tendency to avoid accepting Third World refugees in their own states.
One recent survey cites the lessening commitment of the United States and
European countries to resettle asylum seekers from the Third World.'
Little has been written about the long-term issues associated with refugees
in developing countries. The large-scale integration of refugees is not considered
a realistic option in states with severely restricted economic opportunities. When
6it appears to be the only option, however, Third World countries emphasize the
need for relief assistance from the industrialized countries.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is the
major disburser of international refugee assistance. Its mandate is to protect the
rights of refugees and to promote durable solutions to their problems. The
UNHCR is not intended to be an operational body; its funds flow to refugees
through intermediary organizations. In many less developed countries,
international voluntary agencies are called in to implement assistance when
national capacities are deemed too limited or fragile.
A Third World government may feel its sovereignty threatened when it is
challenged by UNHCR and voluntary agency officials who have their own views
of how resettlement should be carried out. This situation becomes especially
complicated when the refugees are perceived as a threat to national security.
The citizens of a host country are often envious of the special care given to
refugees. Refugee camps have requirements similar to those of a small town, so
as large shipments of aid come in, the effect is felt in surrounding areas. Even
if the refugees are initially welcomed, their burden is soon felt as locals express
concern that they themselves are being crowded out or disadvantaged." When
refugee self-reliance is pursued by a government, disadvantaged groups within the
society may express opposition in response to a perceived competition with
refugees for jobs and social services."
Governments often do not wish to admit the long-term nature of refugee
problems, preferring to take a series of temporary measures while other options
are evaluated. Investment in integration may be discouraged for making
repatriation appear less attractive by comparison." But if repatriation or third
country resettlement is a remote possibility, resources should be directed toward
self-reliance strategies for the refugees. Extended stays in camps can have
detrimental effects on refugees even if their protection, nutrition, medical and
basic educational needs are met.'
RESEARCH DESIGN
Costa Rica makes a good case study of a less developed state beset by a
large refugee influx. It is a small country with limited economic opportunities.
Policies adopted toward the refugees are likely to affect the poorer sectors of
Costa Rica's population, who suffer unemployment, uneven land tenure, rural
poverty and substandard housing.
Yet Costa Rica is different from many Third World countries in a variety of
ways. Costa Rica has enjoyed a standard of living that is generally higher than
that of its Central American neighbors. Indeed, the country exhibits many
political and social features of more developed states. As a stable democracy, it
has fostered a strong sense of nationalism in its citizens. This is institutionalized
in a welfare system that offers health services to the mass of the population; and
public employment to about one fifth of the total work force.
These factors have undoubtedly contributed to Costa Rica's liberal asylum
policy. The country is a signatory to the United Nations Refugee Convention
8and Protocol as well as to numerous Latin American conventions on asylum. In
keeping with this liberal policy, in the late 1970's Costa Rica began accepting
refugees from the various conflicts in Central America.
The new influx, however, has been different from those encountered before.
Earlier refugee movements involved only a few political exiles who were
educated, frequently had wealth, and who stayed temporarily. The refugees
entering Costa Rica recently have come in large numbers; they lack education
and job skills and require high levels of assistance.
These refugees are a challenge to Costa Rica's traditional concept of
asylum, and to the self-image and operation of the welfare state. Official policy
has stated that refugees should be integrated into the society by advancing
through certain stages, from "reception" centers, to "active" training centers, to
final incorporation in the economy. Through financing by the UNHCR, the
government also advocates that refugees have access to national education and
health care services, demonstrating an intention to prevent the development of an
underclass. But accepting international financial and organizational assistance
implies ceding some sovereignty, at a time when national interests call for greater
state control of the refugee crisis.
There is little research published on the refugee problem in Central America.
Perhaps scholars have seen the crisis as ephemeral, and thus not warranting
study, or not appropriate for study because of its transitory nature. Recent
studies have pointed to this lack of research on refugees in other parts of the
world as well.' Much of the work that does exist is in the form of
9consultancies commissioned by humanitarian agencies, lacking theoretical
sophistication. There is benefit to be derived, therefore, from a careful analysis
of the structures, policies and processes involved in the aid to refugees in Costa
Rica.
This thesis seeks to assess the prospects for the integration of refugees in
Costa Rica registered by the UNHCR, in light of the widely varying interests
affecting this issue. The level of analysis is the national context of the refugee
problem. My units of analysis are the institutional actors in this process: the
different agencies within the Costa Rican government: the international agencies
involved in refugee assistance, particularly the UNHCR; and the private voluntary
organizations (PVOs) that work directly with the refugees. From time to time, I
will bring in comparative material from other countries that have dealt with large
refugee influxes.
Based on the prevailing views in the literature cited above, I have
formulated the following research questions:
1. How is Costa Rica's traditionally liberal asylum policy affected by the
enormous refugee influx? What effect do domestic political pressures, and
economic and institutional limitations have on Costa Rica's policy of refugee
integration?
2. The UNHCR is not an operational agency, and thus must rely on
government and private voluntary organizations to implement its assistance.
What role, then, can the UNHCR play in the integration process? Is this agency
geared toward providing the long-term assistance necessary for integration?
10
3. PVO experience is mainly in emergency relief; but some PVOs have close
contact with refugees, can be sensitive to their needs, and may play a crucial role
in integration. How do the different political, social or economic agendas of
PVOs affect their capacity to integrate the refugees?
4. To what extent is refugee integration successful in Costa Rica, considering
the various interests described above?
METHODOLOGY
The lack of research on the refugee problem in Costa Rica made fieldwork
for this thesis imperative. Fagen (1986), Ferris (1985), the U.S. GAO Report
(1984), and Torres-Rivas (1985) offer good comparative overviews of refugee
policies in different countries of the region. These and other writings are mainly
descriptive, however, and focus on emergency and relief efforts.
With financial support from the Latin American and Caribbean Center
(LACC) at Florida International University, I conducted fieldwork in Costa Rica
in July and August of 1986. My research was facilitated by ties with the
Escuela de Relaciones Internacionales of the Universidad Nacional de Costa Rica.
This link was arranged through Professor Francisco Rojas Aravena, a leading
member of the Escuela's staff and a Visiting Fulbright Scholar at FIU during
1986-87.
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I visited four major refugee camps at Albaperal, Boca de Arenal, Limon,
and Achiote and completed over 70 qualitative interviews with refugees and
Costa Rican citizens, and with officials from the government, the UNHCR, and
PVOs. (See the Appendix for a list of the interviews). Some interviewees asked
to be cited anonymously.
Primary informants who provided insight on the refugee assistance system
included a representative of the government refugee commission, the
commission's former director, two former members of President Monge's cabinet,
the chief UNHCR official for Costa Rica, a UNHCR field officer, refugees at the
Albaperal and Limon camps, and officials from the Costa Rican Red Cross, the
Center for Sociopolitical Analysis (CASP-Re and CASP-CAMP) and the
International Rescue Committee.
Key secondary sources were obtained in Costa Rica from libraries at the
Universidad de Costa Rica, the Universidad Para la Paz, the UNHCR, the
National Commission for Refugees, and from other students researching the
refugee influx -- Kinnon Scott, Krysia Munoz, and Peggy Levitt. Other data
were obtained from numerous articles in Costa Rican newspapers: La Nacion, La
Prensa Libre, La Republica, and The Tico Times. Two critical studies of the
government refugee agency, PRIMAS, were written by Vargas and Marmora
(1984) and by the ILO/UNHCR (1985). Cleary (1985) and the UNHCR
Handbook (1982) describe the principles which should guide refugee
self-sufficiency programs, and Koch (1986) analyzes UNHCR programs in Costa
12
Rica. Studies commissioned by the International Rescue Committee and by
CASP-CAMP provide crucial information on the policies of those two PVOs.
While comments by interviewees, and the works cited above, were important
to the writing of this thesis, responsibility for the final version rests entirely with
the author.
ORGANIZATION OF THE THESIS
Following this introductory chapter, Chapter 2 discusses world refugee
affairs in historical perspective and demonstrates how they have become
increasingly complex over time. It also characterizes Costa Rica's "migratory
bomb" by describing the refugees and their impact.
Chapter 3 analyzes the relationship between the refugees and the Costa
Rican welfare state. It discusses labor laws and norms on access to land and
housing that restrict the integration of foreigners. This chapter studies the public
agency which administered refugee assistance from 1982 to 1985, and looks at
the government refugee commission created to coordinate assistance efforts.
Chapter 4 studies the role of international organizations in Costa Rican
refugee affairs. The first section discusses the changing role of the UNHCR and
analyzes UNHCR programs in Costa Rica. The second section looks at the
major influence PVOs are having on refugee integration. Three PVOs are
introduced, and their strategies are evaluated.
13
Chapter 5 presents general conclusions. It summarizes the findings of
previous chapters, reviews research questions, and discusses issues requiring
further study.
14
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Chapter 2
CENTRAL AMERICAN REFUGEES IN COSTA RICA:
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
This chapter looks at refugee affairs in historical perspective and introduces
Costa Rica's refugee problem. It discusses the concept of "refugee" and the
contemporary problem of refugees in developing countries -- in particular, the
region of Central America. Costa Rica's refugee influx is described, as are the
variables affecting their integration into that country.
THE CONCEPT OF "REFUGEE"
According to the UNHCR, a refugee has a well-founded fear of persecution
in his home country for what can broadly be defined as ethnic, religious, or
political reasons. The fundamental obligation of states is to adhere to the
principle of "non-refoulement," that is, to prevent the forced repatriation of a
person to a country where he would be persecuted.
Refugees have existed throughout history. The practice of offering safe
haven was embodied in such concepts as "Christian refuge," "Islamic sanctuary,"
and "African brotherhood."' Since the modern state system arose, it has been
universally acknowledged that the right to regulate entry is a fundamental aspect
of sovereignty. The responsibility for granting asylum to refugees has thus fallen
on national governments.
18
The international framework for assisting refugees was established in the
1950's and 1960's, and was spurred by concern for those displaced by World
War II. The United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of
1951 and the Refugee Protocol of 1967 are the legal instruments which guide
states in the determination of refugee status, and outline states' obligations in the
treatment of refugees. The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for
Refugees (UNHCR) was established in 1951 as the focal point in the
international refugee assistance system. Its primary goals are to safeguard the
rights of refugees, and to provide material assistance to governments of countries
of asylum.2
Governments face tremendous dilemmas if they wish to form coherent
policies towards refugees. The fact that persons may flee both political and
economic repression complicates policy-making. A person who rejects an
economic system -- which might require his being arbitrarily shifted to a new
occupation, for example -- is making a political choice. Although refugees can
legitimately claim that persecution has economic roots and manifestations, there is
widespread abuse of refugee status by persons who migrate solely for economic
reasons. Even when "political persecution" is the strict criterion for determining
refugee status, the use of the term varies: e.g., are persons evading military
service traitors, or refugees for whom a state's discipline has become intolerable?
If the definition becomes too broad, public support for refugee admission policies
may decline.'
19
REFUGEES AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
There are estimated to be over 13 million refugees in the world.' Today
the concept of refugee is considerably more complex than it was immediately
following World War II, and the capacity of nations to deal with large,
continuous flows has become a controversial issue. In the early 1950's,
international attention centered on refugee movements originating in Europe.
Now, more than 90 percent of the world's refugees are found in the Third
World, and are concentrated in the poorest countries. In recent years, two-thirds
of the countries in the World Bank's lowest income category have been either
sending or receiving countries for refugees.' They flee civil war, insurrection,
foreign intervention, revolution, and communal strife.
The definition of refugee was expanded slightly in 1969 by the Organization
for African Unity (OAU) to recognize as refugees those aliens fleeing warfare
and other life-threatening crises, such as famine. While the OAU definition was
born out of political circumstances peculiar to Africa, it has gained increasing
influence in worldwide standards.
Enduring political crises in Southeast Asia, the Horn of Africa, South Asia
and Central America have forced millions of people to flee their homes in search
of safety in other nations. Concern for the reasons behind these refugee
movements leads one to the issue of development: What is the relationship
between poverty and warfare; between underdevelopment and emigration?'
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Refugees often result from "development" itself, when ideologies or policies
conflict. As the Nicaraguan case illustrates, revolutionary development policies
can be the cause behind an exodus of refugees. Nicaragua's activist economic
and social programs have challenged the conservatism of some farmers and
fishermen who were accustomed to freedom from government intervention.
Miskito Indians have been fleeing Nicaragua, for example, to avoid persecution
for resisting movement away from their tribal homelands and for reluctance to
join revolutionary organizations. Such persecution indicates the difficulty of
ensuring that economic development or social change will fit the desired pattern:
Resistance to [development] programs, which may imply disruption of
individual lives and even of whole societies, usually provokes pressure and
punishment. The affected persons often perceive their choices as either
complying and therefore abandoning dearly held values, including livelihood
itself, or resisting and facing punishment. Such circumstances impel people
to become refugees.'
The most desirable solution to refugee situations is for them to return to
their native lands voluntarily. The wars and civil strife in the refugees' home
countries may continue indefinitely, however, leaving resettlement in other
countries as the only option. While no states are completely immune to refugee
influxes, those states proximate to the zones of conflict must carry the heaviest
burden.
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Resettlement of Third World refugees in the developed world is possible
only in the minority of cases. A Ford Foundation study stresses that:
Economic difficulties in the developed world, heightened xenophobic
tendencies resulting from the marked growth of both legal and illegal
migrant populations, the high costs associated with resettlement, and the
difficulty of integrating the uneducated and unskilled into an advanced
industrial society all argue against the widespread use of this solution.!
These refugees are likely to remain in Third World countries, therefore,
placing long term burdens on nations with scarce resources.
REFUGEES AND THE CRISIS IN CENTRAL AMERICA
SOURCE COUNTRIES
The root causes of the conflicts producing refugees in Central America are
found in decades of economic and social inequality, exacerbated by an uneven
development. Between 1950 and 1978 the Central American countries averaged
high growth rates of 5.3 percent; real per capita income doubled. But this
growth increased inequality, as wealth was shifted from salaried and wage
earning workers toward investors and entrepreneurs. The mechanization of
agriculture for exports and the development of capital intensive industries
increased unemployment and inflation.'
Economically active populations in Central America grew and became
impatient in the 1970's. Those governments that did not heed the calls for
22
redistributive public policies and social reform were eventually faced with armed
resistance movements. In densely populated El Salvador, the traditional oligarchy
and the military refused to meet popular demands for change, particularly in the
area of land reform. The intense violence produced by military-guerrilla clashes,
human rights violations, poverty and fear has prompted over 750,000 persons to
flee El Salvador since the late 1970's.1"
In Guatemala, particularly during the early 1980's, the military repression of
opposition produced terror in the country among affected civilian populations.
Paramilitary attacks against students, peasants, workers, religious leaders, and
indigenous groups resulted in thousands of deaths. Since the mid-1970's over
150,000 people have left this country in search of refuge."
Nicaragua too has been a major producer of refugees. During its 1978-79
civil war, over 100,000 Nicaraguans fled to Costa Rica, Honduras, and the United
States. Although approximately 60,000 of these refugees returned to Nicaragua
after the downfall of Somoza in 1979, deteriorating economic conditions,
ideological disputes, human rights violations, and a new civil war have led over
250,000 to emigrate since 1981.'
RECEIVING COUNTRIES
The United States has been reluctant to resettle large numbers of Central
Americans. Past refugee policy has shown that recognition of refugee status is
relative to U.S. foreign policy interests. Persons fleeing antagonistic communist
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governments such as Cuba have easily been granted asylum, whereas persons
fleeing friendly governments such as Haiti and El Salvador have largely been
denied asylum. These latter groups are said to be economically motivated
migrants. Since 1981, however, few of the persons fleeing Communist Nicaragua
have been granted asylum. Many Nicaraguans requesting refugee status in the
U.S. are subject to long bureaucratic delays; others are denied asylum outright.
Both practices are inconsistent with Reagan administration statements about
Nicaragua, but reflect the larger interest in stemming the flow of Central
American refugees to the U.S.
U.S. refugee assistance is channeled primarily through the UNHCR. U.S.
policy emphasizes the resettlement of refugees within the region rather than in
the United States. The rationale for this policy, the U.S. government contends,
lies in the tradition of asylum in the region:
The United States... supports programs designed to encourage and maintain
the tradition of the Central American countries to readily provide asylum to
refugees. The administration believes that because of the long-standing
tradition in the region of granting refuge to political exiles, there is no need
for the United States to provide either asylum or resettlement for large
numbers of these refugees. As a result, for fiscal year 1984, the U. S.
refugee admissions ceiling was reduced to 1000 (down from 2000 for the
previous 2 years) for refugees from the Latin American and Caribbean
regions."
The Central American countries have acceded to numerous Latin American
asylum treaties; some, also, to the UN Refugee Convention and Protocol.
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Common heritage, language, and culture of most political exiles encouraged
governments to grant asylum to individuals.
The nature of refugee flows in Central America today, however, is
incomparable in magnitude to any past flows. Recent refugees have arrived in
massive numbers (see Table 2:1); they lack education and job skills, and they
require greater levels of assistance.' Migration laws in these countries are
inadequate to deal with mass asylum situations. Refugee policies of two Central
American countries -- Belize and Honduras -- are described in Chapter 3, and
contrasted with Costa Rica's policies. Economic conditions in all of Central
America and Mexico are poor; they hardly suffice for their own growing
populations. The introduction of refugees into these scenarios places great strains
on already weak political, economic, and ecological resources.
COSTA RICA AND ITS "MIGRATORY BOMB"
Costa Rica is an exemplary democracy among developing nations. Its
democratic institutions, commitment to social welfare, and pacifist philosophy
stand in stark contrast to the practices of its neighbors. Costa Rica's
humanitarian policy towards refugees -- which includes accession to the UN
Refugee Convention and Protocol -- has been tested by the "migratory bomb""6
confronting the nation since 1980.
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Table 2:1
Central American Refugees In The Region
1986
SOURCE
COUNTRY RECEIVING COUNTRY
Costa Rica Honduras Mexico Belize Nicaragua
Nicaragua 22,000 26,450 - - -
El Salvador 6,100 35,000 120,000 6,000 2,300
Guatemala - 1,000 45,000 3,000 500
Source: U. S. Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey: 1986 in
Review, Washington, D. C.: American Council for Nationalities
Service, 1987, p. 37. Estimates serve to indicate the directions of
refugee flows in the region. Totals must be used with caution, as
sources vary significantly in the number of refugees reported.
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The traditions that have made Costa Rica a special haven are rooted in its
history. Isolation during colonial times and the lack of an exploitable indigenous
population prevented the establishment of an entrenched landlord class in Costa
Rica. Labor laws and an extensive social security system were initiated in the
1940's. The army was disbanded then, greatly reducing future military
expenditures. These developments eased the impact of growth during the 1960's
and 1970's. Extreme inequalities of wealth -- so evident in other parts of
Central America -- have been avoided somewhat in Costa Rica."
Yet Costa Rica is not exempt from the problems of underdevelopment, nor
from the issues that plague the Central American region. Costa Rica's
uniqueness stirs a pride that can blind one to the country's serious social,
economic, and political dilemmas. These problems (elaborated on later in this
chapter) are now compounded by the pressure of refugees.
IMMIGRATION POLICIES
Costa Rica was unprepared for the mass entrance of migrants and refugees
that began in the late 1970's. This has made refugee status and refugees' rights
unclear. Immigration offices have been overworked and understaffed, and the
determination and documentation of refugee status is terribly backlogged. In
some cases, the Immigration Service has deliberately stalled processing because it
does not know what to do with persons ineligible for refugee status -- and thus
for UNHCR assistance -- but who cannot be repatriated."
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At the root of these ambiguous policies is an antiquated immigration law,
written circa 1940, that is only now in the process of being revised. A Tico
Times editorial states:
(In) the innocent old days... the law was so broad and so flexible that it
permitted innumerable interpretations. Immigration officials admitted the
rules could be bent this way or that, depending on who needed what.
Frustrated foreigners often found themselves colliding headlong with
maddening regulations that frequently seemed to be created on the spot, and
applied just as arbitrarily. That's because the old law contained no specific
guidelines, and rules could -- and did -- change with the whims of those
applying them at any given time. 9
The gradual reform of immigration policies began in 1977 when Costa Rica
became the first country in Central America to sign the U.N. Refugee
Convention and Protocol. In response to growing conflict in Central America,
the UNHCR established its regional headquarters in San Jose during Nicaragua's
1978-79 civil war. In the early years of the crisis, Costa Rica gave the UNHCR
and private voluntary organizations (PVOs) substantial autonomy in refugee
work.'0 Soon, however, the government realized that the refugee problem
affected important national security and economic issues. In 1980 the National
Commission for Refugees (CONAPARE) was established to elaborate and
coordinate refugee policy. In August 1983 the government issued a decree that
defined its application of the Convention and Protocol. Persons then on
assistance would be given refugee status, while those not on assistance and future
arrivals would be determined on a case by case basis. Steps would also be taken
for possible group determination of refugee status.'
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In the same year the government began to confront the problem of illegal
migrants with an "empadronamiento" or registration drive. This allowed persons
in the country illegally -- but who did not qualify for refugee status - to become
legal immigrants. The system, designed by the Intergovernmental Committee for
Migration (ICM) has had little success: many migrants have not registered
because they fear forced repatriation. Also, many of those who did come
forward never were legalized because the government repeatedly demanded
further studies and eligibility criteria.'
At the international level, Costa Rica's refugee policy has been characterized
by rhetoric favoring the acceptance of persons seeking safety, in keeping with the
country's peaceful, humanitarian traditions. This was exemplified in Costa Rica's
participation in the "Declaracion de Cartagena." This document resulted from the
1984 UNHCR colloquium, attended by several Latin American countries, which
studied the special problems of refugees in Central America. The "Declaracion"
asked that the OAU precedent be adopted, namely, that the countries in the
region adopt an amplified definition of "refugee," to include:
Persons who have fled their country because their lives, safety or freedom
have been threatened by generalized violence, foreign aggression, internal
conflicts, massive violations of human rights or other circumstances which
have seriously disturbed public order."
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THE REFUGEES AND MIGRANTS
As of June 30th, 1986, the Costa Rican government registered 29,918
refugees; 70 percent of whom are Nicaraguan, 21 percent Salvadoran, and the
remainder of other nationalities. The government estimated, however, that as
many as 250,000 Central Americans, mostly Nicaraguans, were in the country
without documentation.' Providing these figures are correct, this would equal 10
percent of Costa Rica's 2.5 million people, a substantial impact on a country said
to document about 2 percent foreigners just a decade ago.'
While the Costa Rican government put the number of undocumented
migrants around 250,000, the U.S. Embassy in San Jose calculated a lower
figure of 150,000 to 175,000." Table 2:2 indicates that a portion of the migrants
are Nicaraguans who have been living in Costa Rica for decades; many have
constantly moved back and forth across the border. Similar to the situation with
Mexicans in the U.S., the Costa Rican government allowed Nicaraguans to come
in to harvest sugar cane. At the border town of Los Chiles, Costa Ricans and
Nicaraguans have long engaged in commerce, resulting in an ethnic mix in the
area.
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Table 2:2
Costa Rica's Undocumented Migrants
1986
25,000 - 30,000 Nicaraguans, have been living in Costa Rica for several
decades.
30,000 Nicaraguans, came to Costa Rica during Nicaragua's
1978-79 civil war, and remained. (60,000 others who
came during the revolution returned after the Sandinista
triumph.)
50,000 - 60,000 Nicaraguans, are believed to have come to Costa Rica
since 1979.
45,000 Salvadorans and other Central Americans who arrived in
Costa Rica in the 1970's and early 1980's.
Total
150,000-165,000
Source: US Embassy of San Jose's World Refugee Report to Congress, FY
1987, p. 3.
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Why Do They Come?
The refugees and migrants have come to Costa Rica for a variety of
reasons. As of June 30th 1986, there were 6169 registered Salvadoran refugees.8
Most of these Salvadorans arrived soon after 1980, when 200 campesinos
occupied the Costa Rican Embassy in San Salvador. Many Salvadorans fled the
military's "death squads" which were becoming active then, clamping down on
opponents of the government.
Neutral civilians may have felt increasingly caught up in the clashes
between the guerrillas and the military. The inflow of Salvadoran refugees
slowed down abruptly in 1983 when the Costa Rican government began placing
restrictions on the entry of Central Americans. Requirements included an entry
visa, a bank deposit of 15,000 colones, and a return ticket to one's home
country. Because El Salvador shares no border with Costa Rica, most of its
refugees were arriving by air. The restrictions could thus be enforced for the
Salvadorans, as could not be done for the Nicaraguans who crossed the
uncontrolled border.29 The conflict in Nicaragua has also prohibited the arrival of
more Salvadorans who might have traveled over land through Nicaragua into
Costa Rica.
Nicaraguans in Costa Rica may have been against sweeping changes made
by the new revolutionary government at home, such as the teaching of Marxist
ideology, and restrictions on religious freedoms and personal property rights.
Others fled the general conditions of war. Obligatory military service has
prompted thousands of young men -- and more recently, women -- to seek refuge
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in Costa Rica. The uncertain future of the insurgency on Nicaragua's southern
front has likewise caused many "contras" to seek safe haven in Costa Rica. A
recent government report found that 37 percent of the Tilaran refugee camp's
population were men between 13 and 40 years old;" a number of them are
former combatants.
Some fled Nicaragua for what appear to be economic reasons, such as when
food rationing resulted in acute shortages. These persons are often treated as
refugees by the UNHCR for humanitarian reasons, according to Kofy Asomani,
the UNHCR's Deputy Regional Representative in Costa Rica. Persons fleeing
starvation are received as refugees even though they do not fit the strict
definition.'
As economic oppression is increasingly used as a tool of warfare -- by both
governments and guerrilla movements -- the distinction between political and
economic motivations for flight becomes unclear. "Where armies burn fields and
destroy warehouses to seek out opposition forces... there is a mixture of
economic and political repression at work."" Many Nicaraguans in Costa Rica
have fled this type of economic chaos.
Undoubtedly some "refugees" and undocumented immigrants are in Costa
Rica largely for economic reasons. The "push-pull" theory of migration holds
that individuals move "in response to population pressure, lack of economic
opportunity, political change, and the promise of a better life."' As the most
developed country in the region, Costa Rica offers immigrants incentives for
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settlement. Persons may take advantage of the political situation in their home
country to claim "refugee" status.
International assistance available to refugees has been shown to encourage
persons to immigrate. "Quasi refugees are attracted to host countries by
assistance and/or resettlement programs rather than being forcibly expelled by the
governments in their countries of origin."" The existence of this phenomenon
places governments and humanitarian agencies in a difficult position. They must
strike a delicate balance in the giving of assistance: if too much is given
"refugees" may be attracted and encouraged to settle in a host country.
Characteristics
As indicated earlier, data on the number of refugees and migrants in the
country are quite inaccurate. The actual number may be impossible to obtain,
given the limitations of Costa Rica's immigration offices. Since 1980, however,
the number of refugees documented in Costa Rica has risen steadily (see Table
2:3) and the flows have shown no signs of abating. In 1986, only 22.4 percent
or 6,692 of the 29,918 registered refugees resided in camps; the rest lived mainly
in metropolitan San Jose.' Urban refugees represent a greater strain on overused
public services; they raise rents, and they aggravate high urban unemployment.
If faced with inactivity, they are more prone to engage in petty and criminal
legal violations.
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Table 2:3
Distribution of Costa Rica's Refugee Population:
Documented Between 1978/79 and June 30th 1986
NATIONALITY
YEAR TOTAL
Salvadorans Nicaraguans Guatemalans Cubans Others
1978/79 254 486 46 1,562 2 2,350
1980 2,147 86 26 23 7 2,289
1981 2,161 243 48 203 6 2,661
1982 931 333 11 164 20 1,459
1983 330 2,945 17 332 30 3,654
1984 280 4,912 22 101 24 5,339
1985 37 6,823 8 54 11 6,933
1986 29 5,126 8 59 11 5,233
TOTALS 6,169 20,954 186 2,498 111 29,918
Source: Departamento para Refugiados de Migracion, San Jose, Costa Rica,
1986.
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A survey conducted in 1984 notes that refugees -- particularly Nicaraguans
-- have very low levels of education. (See Table 2:4). They are more likely to
compete, therefore, with the poorer sectors of Costa Rica's labor market.
The real threat to the wage laborer, however -- and to the Costa Rican
economy in general -- may be the undocumented migrant'* Many illegal
migrants who arrived after 1979 might qualify for refugee status, and thus for
UNHCR assistance. They prefer to remain illegal because they fear repatriation
or having to be enclosed in camps, or feel they have more to gain by integrating
spontaneously and working without permits.39
The rising xenophobia in the country may be triggered more by the presence
of unregistered migrants than by the refugees. Because illegal migrants cannot
receive UNHCR assistance, they are maintained solely by the Costa Rican
economy. They might take jobs at subminimum wages and thus displace local
workers. It is believed that the undocumented migrants have contributed to the
uncontrolled growth of the informal sector. In recent years the number of street
vendors has soared, threatening hygiene standards. Since they have no access to
social security, undocumented migrants increase hospital budget deficits when
they receive medical attention.'
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Table 2:4
Educational Level of Refugees Interviewed in Costa Rica,
by Nationality
Salvadoran Nicaraguan
Refugees Refugees TOTAL
EDUCATION Abs. Rel. Abs. Rel. Abs. Rel.
Elementary incomplete 31 20.00 33 44.59 64 28.00
Elementary complete 26 16.77 5 6.76 31 14.00
Secondary incomplete 37 23.87 11 14.86 48 20.50
Secondary complete 7.74 5 6.76 17 7.00
University incomplete 12 10.97 1 1.35 18 7.50
University complete 17 1.29 - - 2 1.00
Never studied 2 2.58 19 25.68 23 10.00
No reply 4 16.78 - - 26 12.00
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TOTAL 155 100.00 74 100.00 229 100.00
Source: Vega Carballo, Jose Luis "Inmigrantes Centroamericanos en Costa
Rica," Estudios Sociales Centroamericanos, No. 40, Enero - Abril
1986, p. 94.
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CONDITIONS FOR REFUGEE INTEGRATION
Political
The orientation of the Costa Rican government regarding the integration of
refugees will be discussed in detail in the next chapter. But some factors are
presented here.
The refugee crisis is a long term problem that will affect the development
of Costa Rica. Unable to handle the crisis alone, the government must cautiously
coordinate the use of relief funds, and the actions of international organizations
and voluntary agencies. The country must plan, as well, for the possible
incorporation of the refugees into the local economy.
Costa Rica is unable to control its northern border: it is 220 miles long and
passes through jungle along the San Juan River, where there are few towns and
roads. Costa Rica has no military and its Civil Guard is unequipped to
adequately patrol the border.4' The persistent entry of foreigners is threatening
the country's generous refugee policy.
Immediate and long range policies will be affected by the many thousands
of undocumented migrants. Any escalation of the war in Nicaragua will pose the
question of whether these migrants will become "a posteriori" refugees: persons
who entered as migrants but who become refugees given their inability to return
to their home country."
The continued violation of asylum and neutrality policies by Nicaraguan
migrants has produced an increasing antagonism toward foreigners in the country
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that threatens the fair treatment of refugees. The existence of rebels along the
border struggling against the Sandinistas has been a key factor in deteriorating
relations between Costa Rica and Nicaragua. Costa Rican asylum policy allows
for exiles to organize politically, but military activities are illegal.43
Economic
Despite its advancements, Costa Rica does suffer many of the ills of
developing countries. These will directly affect its ability to accept and
incorporate the mass influx of refugees. Only 11.6 percent of the total land
surface in Costa Rica is suitable for intensive agricultural use." The size of
private land holdings has grown in the past few decades, and three-fourths of all
rural workers are landless peasants. Development planning has favored the urban
center: health and education services in rural areas are inferior. One quarter of
Costa Rica's population lives below the poverty level, but 75 percent of the poor
live in rural areas. Migration to metropolitan San Jose has caused overcrowding:
jobs are scarce, housing is inadequate, slums are growing.45 An estimated
300,000 Costa Ricans reside in deplorable living conditions.'
The refugees will be a heavy burden on Costa Rica's welfare state. The
desire to provide equal services for all residents of the country is a high priority
for the government, both just and wise in one official's opinion.47 But the
welfare system has already come under sharp criticism in recent years. It
provides Costa Ricans with extensive health care services and education despite a
weak tax base, resulting in persistent budget deficits. Critics say that the welfare
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state has grown beyond the capacity of the Costa Rican economy to support it.'
The goal of providing the refugees with equal access to social services is very
forward-looking on the part of the Costa Rican government, according to one
voluntary agency official. It demonstrates the intention to prevent the
development of an underclass. At the same time, however, this goal has
paralyzed negotiations for the integration of the refugees since it is impossible for
the Costa Rican government to provide such services without continuing
assistance from the UNHCR."
The financing of Costa Rica's welfare state has resulted in a foreign debt of
$4.5 billion, one of the highest per capita rates in the world. The International
Monetary Fund (IMF) is pressuring the government to cut social spending, a pill
which Costa Rica's powerful bureaucracy may refuse to swallow. One austerity
measure asks for the elimination of up to 4,000 government jobs over the next
four years. This would increase unemployment, which is officially 6.1 percent,'
but is estimated to be more than twice that figure.' Ironically, the Arias
administration's campaign slogan promised to Costa Ricans 25,000 new jobs and
20,000 new houses; these two goals, Arias contended, could be achieved through
stimulation of the private sector. 2  Continued regional instability, however, will
lead to capital flight and reduced investment and tourism. Arias' goals would
hence necessitate expanded state involvement.
Costa Rica's economic conditions are hardly conducive to a warm reception
for the tens of thousands of refugees in need of assistance. The country cannot
have the luxury of selecting at its borders the most economically profitable
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refugees, moreover. To turn back refugees would be inhumane and subject to
international condemnation.
Social
Costa Ricans have traditionally considered themselves different from and
even superior to other Central Americans. They base this on their homogeneous,
"whiter" appearance, but also on their comparatively higher standards in health,
education, and social welfare, and their strong political democracy." They have
been apprehensive about the possibility that large numbers of refugees -- many of
them poor and illiterate -- may be in the country permanently.
Costa Rica's influential press has played a role in portraying the refugee as
an unstable person, who threatens established health and cultural standards, and
who is in the country largely for economic reasons. These misrepresentations
result partly from a lack of in depth study, and partly from failure to distinguish
between the undocumented migrant and the refugee." Misunderstanding has led
to the adoption of policies, such as opposition to the establishment of new camps
and settlements, which might put off the time when refugees can become
productive members of society. The illegal migrants, not the refugees in
settlements, for instance, evade health standards. Opposition to new settlements,
therefore, exacerbates the problems of the migrants and of declining health
standards.
During 1986, government officials made statements indicating that persons
who violate the country's asylum traditions may be expelled forcibly. On one
41
occasion, the Vice Minister of Government indicated that entering Nicaraguans
should be returned at the border;' this would be a clear violation of "non
refoulement." Such policy statements often occur after a change of government,
because officials do not understand the refugee field, and the implications certain
actions can have internationally.57 Given local pressures against the presence of
foreigners, some officials react xenophobically.
Xenophobia becomes dangerous when actions taken out of dislike of
foreigners are out of proportion to the actual problem, and go beyond what may
be reasonably perceived as defending a nation's interest.' Asylum seekers may
be given less than sympathetic treatment, and deterrent measures may be taken to
stem the flow of refugees. The danger is that the asylum seeker is treated as a
regular alien; his special situation as a refugee is overlooked. The persistence of
an alarmist, or "emergency" view of the refugee influx could hinder the evolution
of policies that will make refugees a resource rather than a burden for Costa
Rica. While the refugees' presence is officially seen as a crisis, some studies
have shown that refugees fill labor shortages and stimulate markets in certain
areas.59
The following chapter describes in detail Costa Rica's refugee policies and
programs. By comparing these briefly to the policies of other developing
countries, one sees the benefits and limitations refugees face in Costa Rica's
welfare state.
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Chapter 3
REFUGEES AND THE COSTA RICAN STATE
A refugee influx tests the capacity of a government to make policy and
solve problems. Refugee affairs affect many sectors of society: public security,
health, education, employment, land tenure, and development planning.
A refugee problem also tests a nation's capacity to deal in the international
realm. Few developing countries would be able to handle a refugee influx
without substantial international aid. Outside intervention is needed to cope with
a problem which already threatens a nation's sovereignty. This is the scenario
within which refugee assistance operates.
If a host state must accept international financial and organizational
assistance, it can expect to receive pressure from abroad. In such a case, a
government may find it difficult to remain dominant when it is challenged by
international and voluntary agency officials who have their own views of how
assistance or resettlement should be carried out.'
While a government may speak of acceptance or integration of refugees in
the abstract, policies tend to be determined by practical political considerations.
No government -- no matter how altruistic -- is likely to sacrifice any
considerable national interest to a cause which is still of secondary importance.2
This chapter studies how Central American refugees fare in Costa Rica, a
country with a strong welfare state. Costa Rica's social and refugee policies are
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compared to those of other countries. The implementation of specific policies is
detailed, and then evaluated.
THE CONTEXT OF ASSISTANCE IN COSTA RICA
Refugees in Costa Rica appear to have far better opportunities than in other
developing countries. The social welfare system provides universal education and
health care. Refugees (through financing by the UNHCR) have access to these
services that might not have been available in their home countries. But this
point is not so simple. Costa Rica's highly institutionalized state protects its
citizens but is resistant to the reforms necessary to accommodate a sudden influx
of foreigners.
Social legislation protects nationals through labor laws, and laws on access
to land. These standards affect the refugees in the following ways:
(1) Refugee integration is hindered through laws that limit the
employment of foreigners.
(2) Land, which is scarce, is reserved for nationals.
(3) Costa Rica's "colegios profesionales," or professional associations,
restrict the employment of foreigners. This includes refugee
doctors who could be of great use in rural refugee camps and
settlements, where most Costa Rican doctors are unwilling to
practice.
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BENEFITS
Refugees in Costa Rica can benefit from the most advanced educational and
health care services in the region. In Costa Rica, all children must attend school;
health standards are high, supported by the social security system (the Caja
Costarricense de Seguro Social, CCSS).
By comparison, Honduras, which has also received large numbers of
refugees, suffers inferior social standards. Fifty-seven percent of Honduran
families live in extreme poverty, lacking enough income to buy the basic basket
of food. Over 40.5 percent of the population is said to be illiterate, and 72.5
percent of children under age 5 show some degree of malnutrition.' (Other
socioeconomic indicators for Costa Rica and its neighbors are found in Table
3:1).
The Costa Rican government holds that all residents of the country should
receive the proper social services, in order to maintain the country's high
standards and prevent the development of an underclass.4 The UNHCR thus pays
the CCSS monthly for medical attention, at camps and in urban areas, to all
refugees who carry the proper identification.' Similar payments are made to the
Ministry of Public Education; schools are set up in camps, and urban refugee
children attend public schools.'
Most refugees from Nicaragua never had access to such services at home.
Many of them have arrived in Costa Rica without ever having attended school, or
having received inoculations.'
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Table 3:1
Various Social and Economic Indicators Comparing
Costa Rica with its Central American Neighbors
Percent of Death rate among
National Children of 14
Budget Years of age, Life
Population Area Spent on Literacy, 1970 (per Expectancy Inhabitants
1980 (square Education 1975 thousand at birth per Doctor,
(in thousands) miles) 1977 (percent) inhabitants) 1975-80 1968-71
Costa Rica 2,286 19,695 32.7 89 4.0 69.7 1,804
El Salvador 4,813 8,260 22.8 59 14.5 62.2 5,101
Guatemala 7,100 42,042 16.0 48 30.0 57.8 4,498
Honduras 3,595 43,277 19.1 45' 20.0 53.1 4,085
Nicaragua 2,733 57,000 13.0 52 18.4 52.9 2,014
Percent of Telephones
Percent of Population with 1976
Population with Drinking Water, per Length of Roads
Electric Lighting, 1975 in hundred 1975 (in kilometers)
1973 Urban Rural thousands inhabitants Total Paved
Costa Rica 66.4 100 56 127 6.2 24,724 1,939
El Salvador 34.0 89 28 60 1.4 10,975 1,408
Guatemala 22.1 85 14 52' 1.0' 13,625 2,638
Honduras 17.0 100 10 20 .7 6,595 1,327
Nicaragua 45.0 100 14 55 2.5 17,526 1,597
In 1961
In 1973
From: Charles D. Ameringer, Democracy in Costa Rica, New York: Praeger,
1982, pp. 14-15.
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RESTRAINTS ON ACCESS TO JOBS AND LAND
While refugees might benefit from the conditions described above, they do
not have easy entry into the formal economy. The Costa Rican case can be
illustrated by describing the contrasting situation in Belize, another Central
American country that is haven to the region's refugees. In the early 1980's
Belize received Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees. Belize is one of the least
populated countries in the region, and has a substantial amount of unused land.
As refugees entered, they squatted on arable land and formed communities. They
also took jobs in the agro-industry, where there were numerous openings. The
Belizean government adopted a "do-nothing" policy, which only later would be
altered in the face of growing numbers of refugees.'
Refugees encountered different circumstances upon entering Costa Rica.
Legislation protects national workers and hence limits the employment of
refugees. Costa Rica's Commerce Code, Article 8, states that foreigners cannot
engage in commerce until they have resided in the country for 10 years.' Article
13 of the Labor Code notes that no more than 10 percent of a company's
workers can be of foreign extraction." The Costa Rican Constitution, Article 68,
also states that in equality of conditions, the Costa Rican worker will be
preferred over the foreigner."
Only 11.6 percent of Costa Rica's land is suitable for intensive agricultural
use. Most of this is privately owned. 2  The government has been under
considerable pressure from land-hungry Costa Rican peasants -- increasingly so as
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employment opportunities in agribusiness and industry decrease.' Public land is
reserved for landless farmers, therefore, for the establishment of agricultural
cooperatives. This land is not available for refugee settlement. 4
THE "COLEGIOS PROFESIONALES"
Costa Rica's powerful professional classes, through their "colegios
profesionales," have been criticized for being "parasitic and inefficient because
they are immune to competition."" They limit the employment of foreigners in
teaching and medicine among other fields. The colegios have been intransigent
in the face of the refugee problem: refugee professionals are restricted from
practicing. The irony of this custom is that the country chooses to exclude the
contributions of qualified individuals, who might improve medical or educational
services in rural areas, for example.'6
Refugees in camps also suffer the traditions of the colegios. Medical
attention is poor because Costa Rican doctors are reluctant to practice in remote
areas. The UNHCR has had to offer national physicians special bonuses, above
and beyond basic salaries, to persuade them to remain in the camps, and
persevere in their work."'
Refugees could benefit from solving their own problems. But the colegios
maintain a nationalistic outlook: if refugee doctors (and US volunteers) are
barred from practicing, the UNHCR will have to hire Costa Rican doctors."8
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POLICY AND IMPLEMENTATION
The Costa Rican government was unprepared to handle the large influx of
refugees that began to cross its borders in the late 1970's. It initially delegated
much work to the UNHCR and a few PVOs (most of which had no experience
in the refugee field). The government gradually came to play a more active role,
however, and urged the UNHCR to hire national rather than foreign agencies to
run major refugee programs. 9 This policy differed from that of Honduras, which
allowed numerous foreign PVOs to operate refugee camps and settlements in the
country. Many of the PVOs in Honduras are experienced in working with
refugees and are members of the International Council of Voluntary Agencies
(ICVA).
COSTA RICA'S REFUGEE COMMISSION 1980-82
Costa Rica's National Commission for Refugees (CONAPARE) was created
in 1980, but it was not until 1982 that it began to actively coordinate refugee
affairs. Members of the incoming Monge administration charged that the
previous Carazo administration had delegated too much to the UNHCR and
PVOs. CONAPARE had no executive office and little political power.'
Monge issued a decree in December of 1982" which called for reform in
CONAPARE, appointing a director and placing the commission under the
Ministry of Justice. The Commission would also have representatives from the
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Ministries of Foreign Relations, Interior, Labor and Social Security, Public
Security, Planning and the Presidency. Four semi-autonomous national agencies,
as implementors of refugee programs, also would participate in CONAPARE: the
Social Assistance Institute (IMAS), the Agrarian Development Institute (IDA), the
National Training Institute (INA), and the Costa Rican Red Cross. The UNHCR
and the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM), involved primarily in
transporting refugees at the border, would be invited to attend CONAPARE's
weekly meetings, but without votes.
The reformed CONAPARE was to supervise the day-to-day functioning of
refugee assistance, authorizing all projects of the UNHCR and PVOs, and
coordinating with relevant government ministries. In conjunction with the
National Security Council, CONAPARE would define refugee policies, such as
that of integration. CONAPARE declared that refugees should advance through
certain stages, from reception centers to productive projects, and eventually be
incorporated into the national economy."
HONDURAN REFUGEE POLICY: A COMPARISON
The Honduran government has not directly involved itself in refugee
programs. While it does have a National Commission for Refugees, the UNHCR
and international PVOs coordinate and implement most of the assistance.' These
agencies are said to have more political restrictions than in Costa Rica.'
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Honduras is more actively involved in the region's conflicts, and the refugees in
its territory are treated differentially.
Faced with the entrance of large numbers of Salvadoran and Nicaraguan
refugees, the Honduran government has favored the Nicaraguans. This affects the
programs agencies can pursue with the refugees. Nicaraguans are allowed to
leave their camps, participate in local markets, and even to conduct their struggle
against Nicaragua's government from Honduran territory. The Salvadorans, in
contrast (who have long been the subjects of Honduran antipathy) are allowed
little freedom of movement and are kept in insecure border zones where they
have been attacked by both the Salvadoran and Honduran militaries.
In operational matters, however, Honduras gives international agencies
substantial autonomy. CARITAS, the Catholic Episcopal Conference, administers
a few camps for Salvadorans and Guatemalans, and is responsible for education
and workshops at these camps. Catholic Relief Services conducts
employment/training projects at a number of camps for Salvadorans. World
Relief coordinates the entire assistance project for Miskito and Sumo Indians in
the Gracias a Dios province. Medecins Sans Frontieres, a French agency,
conducts health programs in all of Honduras' refugee camps.'
In keeping with its neutral and centrist political tradition, Costa Rica has
accepted refugees from both El Salvador and Nicaragua. The UNHCR and PVOs
experience few political restrictions regarding treatment of different groups. Yet
in operational matters, the government has sought to play a dominant role. Costa
Rica's major refugee programs have been run by nationals.
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CONAPARE AND IMAS: 1982-1985
As the Costa Rican government sought to increase its role in refugee affairs
after 1982, its relations with the UNHCR deteriorated. The UNHCR was not
accustomed to the limitations brought on by Costa Rica's strong governmental
structure, and found it difficult to plan and execute its programs." Unlike in
Honduras, where the UNHCR had substantial autonomy in the coordination of
relief activities, all projects - no matter how small - were subject to
CONAPARE's authorization.
Critics charged that CONAPARE did not have the experience or
administrative capacity to realize such authorization. Rather than facilitating the
work of implementing agencies, CONAPARE was seen to interfere; leading to a
duplication of functions and extensive bureaucratic delays.'
As Levitt notes, UNHCR officials found that:
The government's need to exercise control was excessive and misdirected, as
demonstrated by its decision to delegate responsibility for refugee training
and camp administration to incompetent (government) agencies... . There
was also a sense that the government did not know what it was doing but
would not accept UNHCR's guidance. Indeed, some allocated funds were
not spent because the government could not devise feasible proposals for
their expenditure."
The Costa Rican Red Cross had been called on to implement refugee
assistance when the crisis began in 1979-80. A shift in agencies after 1982
illustrated the government's interest in controlling the affairs of refugees, who
were growing in number and appeared to be staying indefinitely.' From 1982 to
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1985 major refugee programs were implemented by an existing semi-autonomous
government agency. The Social Assistance Institute (IMAS) -- a welfare agency
designed to combat extreme poverty -- distributed emergency assistance,
administered camps, and oversaw productive projects for refugees. The National
Training Institute (INA) also began to train refugees for possible insertion into
the labor market.
PRIMAS, the Refugee Program within IMAS, proved inadequate for refugee
assistance. Studies conducted by Fagen and by the International Labor
Organization (ILO) with the UNHCR revealed administrative deficiencies in the
whole program, especially with respect to camps.
1. Decision-making -- even on minor issues -- was highly centralized in
IMAS. There was no well-defined delegation of responsibilities to PRIMAS,
much less to individual camp administrators.'
2. There were extensive delays in the delivery of supplies to refugees in
camps. IMAS staff...
"was required to purchase all major supplies from government outlets -- the
equivalent to the U.S. General Services. These supply channels, designed
for long term supplementary assistance programs, were inadequate for
refugee needs. For example, the government did not supply fresh
vegetables, and there was inadequate space in the camps to grow them in
sufficient quantity. Hence, although vegetables could be purchased
inexpensively in local markets, refugees lacked these fundamental nutritional
elements in their diets."32
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3. PRIMAS poorly controlled the distribution of emergency assistance.
Many refugees in urban areas began working but continued to receive
assistance."
4. PRIMAS' administrative bureaucracy grew excessively, duplicating
functions in accounting, for instance, while leaving other areas understaffed.
Personnel were hired by IMAS (many times unqualified for positions) without
consulting the UNHCR or PRIMAS.
PRIMAS was finally replaced as a refugee agency after it was discovered,
in late 1984, that 10 million colones (approximately $300,000) had been
embezzled. PRIMAS officials allegedly over-reported expenditures for supplies
they bought more cheaply or never purchased." A UNHCR audit requested that
the government agency IMAS divest itself of refugee programs.
A new set of private voluntary organizations, two of them national, began
implementing assistance in 1985. The procedure by which these agencies were
chosen is unclear and has not been studied in depth. One foreign PVO, the
International Rescue Committee (IRC), began managing a camp at Achiote; a few
other foreign agencies ran small-scale employment and training programs, mostly
for Salvadorans. Other major camps, however, and the urban program which
assisted over 23,000 refugees in 1986,6 were administered by national agencies.
The Costa Rican Red Cross managed assistance at the Boca de Arenal and
Alvaperal camps for Nicaraguans. A new agency, the Center for Sociopolitical
Analysis (CASP), implemented the urban program and camps at Tilaran and
Limon. As will be discussed later, these two agencies showed major deficiencies
61
as administrators of long term refugee programs. In its concern with having
nationals run programs, Costa Rica sacrificed the efficiency of assistance to
national interest.
POLICY REFORMS: 1985-1986
General dissatisfaction with the administration of assistance culminated in a
seminar in the summer of 1985, attended by government, UNHCR, and PVO
officials. A consensus was reached: the refugee problem could no longer be
considered in isolation. Because refugee issues involved all ministries of
government, it was difficult to implement CONAPARE policies from within the
Ministry of Justice."
A decree issued in August of 1985 announced another change in the refugee
commission." It would be placed directly under the executive, establishing
mechanisms of "cohesion and efficiency" that could result in a quicker channeling
of international funds and more effective application of policies defined by the
President." A National Council for Refugees -- composed of the President, Vice
President, Minister and Vice Minister of the Presidency -- would replace
CONAPARE as policy-maker for refugee affairs. An Executive Director who
would head the Directorate General (DIGEPARE) would be responsible for
carrying out directives of the Council, and continuing coordination of assistance.
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A prominent goal of the new DIGEPARE was to speed the integration of
the refugees, by facilitating the granting of work permits, and the transfer of
refugees from transit centers to "active" (training) centers and to "mixed"
projects, involving nationals.**
Before going on to an evaluation of Costa Rica's refugee policies and
programs, it may be useful to discuss briefly the procedures through which
refugees are documented.
DOCUMENTATION PROCEDURES
After 1982, an office devoted strictly to refugee affairs was created within
Costa Rica's Immigration Service, to speed documentation in the face of
increasing entries. The following describes official procedures.
Individuals crossing at the border may request refugee status at a station.
The Refugee Office interviews applicants there, and determines whether they
qualify for this status. If so, they are given a "resolution," a temporary
identification. They are then transferred by the ICM to a reception center where
they receive emergency medical treatment, food, and shelter. Refugees are later
transferred to transit centers, where they are reinterviewed by the Refugee Office.
Resolutions are renewed at first every 30 days and later every 60 days.
Eventually, refugee cards are given to those who qualify, and are renewed
yearly."'
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Refugees entering through the airport are documented in a similar fashion.
If they enter with tourist visas, however, they have a certain time period (15-30
days) to request refugee status. Persons who do not qualify for refugee status
must seek a different status, or leave the country; but few had been deported
through 1986.42
EVALUATION OF POLICIES AND PROGRAMS
Administrative changes and the influx of new funds did little to bolster the
effectiveness of Costa Rica's refugee commission. Visits to camps and
observations made during 1986 indicated that serious deficiencies existed in
refugee programs. As is detailed below, camps were overcrowded and
government ministries were very slow in delivering services to refugees.
DIGEPARE -- the new refugee commission -- had grown, but not substantially
improved its ability to coordinate assistance or integration.
Transit Centers were populated well above capacity, and refugees remained
in them for months or years. The Tilaran camp, for example, housed 3041
people as of June 1986,43 well beyond its supposed 1500 person capacity."
These centers did not have the proper services or structures for such long range
assistance.
Government ministries communicated poorly with the PVO's that were
administering camps. The Ministry of Health's responses to health and sanitation
problems were insufficient or extensively delayed, resulting in contamination and
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disease.45 The Ministry of Public Education delayed payments of salaries to
teachers in camps, sometimes for many months, thus placing a great burden on
implementing agencies.' Excessive customs delays prohibited the arrival at
camps of gifts and donations from abroad. Merchandise was known to remain in
customs warehouses for months. 7
DIGEPARE did little to expedite the documentation of refugees in camps or
of migrants outside of camps. The procedures outlined earlier were not followed
in practice. Many refugees in camps were not issued "resolutions," or
identification documents. Local hospitals and CCSS offices had to attend these
persons, thus running up budget deficits. At times, PVOs did extensive
paperwork to get clinics reimbursed by the UNHCR."
Without knowledge of who were bonafide refugees, it was extremely
difficult to make refugees part of any development or integration plan. The large
number of undocumented workers in the country continued to evade health
standards, work at sub-minimum wages, and burden weak infrastructures.
Municipal governments in northern regions called for more concrete policies from
the national government. 0
In late 1985, DIGEPARE received a grant of $1.8 million from the
European Economic Community (EEC).' This money financed new technicians
and professionals, and new cars," but did not substantially improve DIGEPARE's
ability to coordinate assistance or integration. As of August 1986 none of this
money had been signed off for integration projects.
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DIGEPARE had little political power. It failed to negotiate with a local
community opposed to the opening of a new camp at Altamirita in August 1986.
DIGEPARE also failed to prevent passage, in the summer of 1986, of measures
in a new Migration Law 3 which were detrimental to refugee interests. The new
law would remove the voice of DIGEPARE and the Ministry of Labor from the
Mixed Commission which grants work permits to refugees. Costa Rica's
Immigration Service -- traditionally hostile to giving foreigners permits -- was
left in charge.
COSTA RICAN BUREAUCRACY
The tendency of Costa Rican bureaucracy to expand and to distribute
salaries -- rather than concentrate more heavily on problem solving -- had
surfaced in the refugee commission. By late 1986 DIGEPARE had over 80
employees.'
Costa Rica's public sector employs approximately 20 percent of the total
work force and absorbs 28 percent of the national income." The public sector
has grown to such proportions, according to one expert, because it is used as a
means of employing, and thus controlling, educated urban classes.' Public
employees are the best paid and most highly unionized salaried workers in the
country. They are protected by a civil service system that rewards seniority
rather than ability."
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This bureaucracy often leaves its basic mission unfulfilled: to provide social
services to the Costa Rican people. Instead, services are monopolized by the
bureaucracy and never reach the poor:
"The bureaucratic middle class is often called a bottleneck; its voracity eats
up so much of the social benefits provided by the government that many of
these never reach the poor.""
The "bureaucratic bourgeoisie" have become so powerful that they are able
to prevent reforms that, while in the interest of the poor, would require them to
make sacrifices."
International humanitarian funds intended for refugees have thus been lost in
large, lethargic bureaucracies, just as national funds intended for the poor are.
CONCLUSION
A UNHCR official with experience in Africa and other Latin American
countries characterized Costa Rica's as the most difficult bureaucracy he has ever
worked with. "The answer to every question is 'yes, but...'"' He tempered this
complaint with praise for Costa Rica's liberal democracy. The democratic
government has to answer to so many competing interests that it is difficult to
effect policy.
The refugee crisis is an unexpected burden on Costa Rica. It has taken
time for the government to develop policies, and the institutions to implement
these. The rights of refugees are unclear. Many live in squalid conditions in
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camps, which refugee commission members visit infrequently. There is poor
communication between the government and the agencies which administer
assistance.
The ineffectiveness of Costa Rica's refugee program, however, results from
more than inexperience and the increasing numbers of refugees. The government
is under pressure for jobs from its own lower and middle class citizens. Costa
Rican bureaucracy naturally tends to expand and to distribute salaries to put off
discontent among growing working classes. This tendency has been reproduced
in the national refugee commission, which has received new funds and has grown
in its number of employees, but has improved little in its ability to coordinate
assistance.
One does not find any blatant diversion of refugee relief in Costa Rica.
Upon closer examination, however, it is evident that the humanitarian purpose of
much assistance is lost. The Costa Rican government has declared a policy of
acceptance and integration of refugees. It cannot realize these goals, however,
because it must first satisfy its citizens, whose interests it has traditionally
defended.
Costa Rica's welfare state maintains firm control of refugee programs, for
security reasons, but also to employ the country's large pool of technicians and
professionals. This has meant sacrificing the efficiency of assistance. A public
agency, IMAS, chosen to administer assistance, proved inadequate. It was slow
in resolving problems and delivering supplies, decision-making was highly
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centralized, its administrative bureaucracy grew excessively, and some of its
employees embezzled assistance funds.
National PVOs have taken over major refugee programs from public institutions,
but health and education are still run by relevant government ministries.
Refugees are low on the scale of issues important to these large bureaucracies
and thus receive poor attention.
Although the new refugee commission, DIGEPARE, has grown through
funding by the UNHCR and other sources, it has little political power and cannot
effectively coordinate assistance.
The next chapter discusses another set of actors involved in refugee affairs:
the nongovernmental organizations. Specifically, it evaluates the roles played by
the UNHCR and PVOs in integrating refugees into Costa Rican society.
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Chapter 4
NONGOVERNMENTAL ACTORS AND REFUGEE INTEGRATION
This chapter examines the important roles nongovernmental actors play in
assisting and integrating refugees.
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) is at the
center of the international refugee assistance system. Over the years, its
functions have changed as refugee needs have changed. The first section below
analyzes characteristics of the UNHCR as they affect long term solutions to
Costa Rica's refugee problems.
The second part of the chapter discusses the roles of private voluntary
organizations (PVOs) as implementors of refugee assistance. PVOs have been
found in many cases to assist refugees more effectively than government
agencies. I introduce three PVOs assisting refugees in Costa Rica and evaluate
them, based on their bureaucratic interests and strategies for refugee
self-sufficiency.
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THE UNHCR
The primary functions of the UNHCR are defined as follows:
INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION -- to promote and safeguard the rights of
refugees in such vital fields as employment, education, residence, freedom of
movement, and security against being returned to a country where they may
be in danger of persecution.
MATERIAL ASSISTANCE -- to assist governments of countries of asylum
in the task of making refugees self supporting as rapidly as possible.
Though UNHCR is sometimes called upon by governments to provide
emergency relief, its assistance is intended primarily to promote durable
solutions to the problems of refugees through voluntary repatriation, local
integration, or resettlement in another country.'
The UNHCR persuades some governments to safely accept citizens who
have fled and wish to return, and persuades others to integrate refugees who
cannot return to their home countries. While the agency offers advice on how to
use refugee assistance, it does not engage actively in operations.
The UNHCR has gradually evolved since its inception in 1951 in order to
meet the changing needs of refugee phenomena. Its original purpose was to
protect refugees emerging from World War H, assisting them in camps until they
were permanently resettled. It is now the major recipient and disburser of
international funds contributed by governments for refugees. The UNHCR has
grown in a haphazard manner, in part because it has had to deal with
unanticipated difficulties, such as the new long-term nature of refugee problems.2
Until 1972 a large portion of the UNHCR's material assistance efforts were
meant for host-state integration programs. Since then, the proportion of spending
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allocated for relief has grown substantially, indicating that permanent solutions
are increasingly difficult to achieve. As seen in Tables 4:1 and 4:2, the ratio of
1985 spending in Costa Rica for maintenance versus settlement of refugees was
about 3 to 1.
This section studies characteristics of the UNHCR as observed during field
research in Costa Rica. Three points are emphasized:
(1) The UNHCR is not a service delivery institution.
(2) The UNHCR is oriented toward providing short-term rather than
long-term assistance.
(3) By virtue of its diplomatic status, the UNHCR must adapt its
political work to the national policies of a specific country.
Each of these points is considered in the following subsections.
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Table 4:1
UNHCR Assistance in Costa Rica
1986
1985 Proposed
Expenditures Expenditures
Type of Assistance $U.S. $U.S.
Local Settlement
a. Urban Local Settlement assistance
to refugees of Central American
origin, approx. 12,300 858,656 1,132,570
b. Rural Settlement assistance to
Nicaraguan refugees, approx. 7,500 106,500 2,355,056
Lower Secondary Education 109,000 95,000
Multipurpose Assistance
(Urban and rural) 4,935,172 3,322,575
Resettlement 8,200
Voluntary Repatriation 20,000 37,000
Legal Assistance 89,000 70,000
Counselling 215,000 169,000
Assistance to Handicapped Refugees 43,000 49,900
Supplementary Aid 378,000 46,300
SPECIAL PROGRAMS 105,000
Higher Education 250,000
TOTAL $U.S. 7,012,528 7,382,401
Source: Regional Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, Situation of the Refugee
Program in Costa Rica, San Jose, Costa Rica; 30 June 1986.
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Table 4:2
Operational Program for Activities in 1986
TYPE OF ASSISTANCE DESCRIPTION SUMMARY
Local settlement a) Urban local settlement assistance to refugees of
primarily Central American origin, approx. 12,300.
b) Rural settlement assistance to Nicaraguan refugees,
approx. 7,500.
Multipurpose assistance Care and maintenance of urban and rural refugees, approx.
20,000, pending durable solutions.
For urban, includes rent subsides, education,
health; for rural, food, housing, health and
education.
Lower secondary education Scholarships for some 550 refugee students.
Resettlement Medical and travel costs for refugees and their families
resettled from the various countries covered by the Regional
Office.
Voluntary repatriation Travel and related costs for refugees voluntarily repatriated
from Costa Rica.
Legal assistance Funding of legal fees, documentation and related legal
services for refugees.
Counselling Funding of legal fees, documentation and related legal
services for refugees.
Assistance to handicapped refugees Therapeutic treatment for handicapped refugees including
vulnerable groups and victims of torture.
Supplementary aid Temporary assistance to newly arrived refugees.
Program support and administration Junior Professional Officer.
SPECIAL PROGRAMS
Education account Scholarships for approx. 380 refugee students: higher
secondary and university.
Other trust funds
Source: Regional Office of the High Commissioner for Refugees, Situation of the Refugee Program in
Costa Rica, San Jose, Costa Rica; 30 June 1986.
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INDIRECT ROLE IN REFUGEE ASSISTANCE
The UNHCR emphasizes flexibility in management in order to adapt to the
diverse political, economic and social environments of countries. UNHCR
officials are assigned to specific countries for brief periods of 2-3 years in order
to maintain the political neutrality necessary for diplomacy.' This often means
that officials are unfamiliar with a local political and socioeconomic structure.
These practices have made it difficult for the UNHCR to accumulate
technical expertise and discretion. As one analyst notes, the institution has a
limited sense of history: in the UNHCR, "twenty years of experience is one
year's experience twenty times."
Members of the refugee policy community differ on how the UNHCR might
enhance its technical efficiency. Some argue for increased planning. Others
stress flexibility. Pitterman has discussed this debate:
The advocates of more systematic planning argue that there are certain
elements to international assistance programs that need to be thoroughly
conceptualized on a longer term basis... improved planning will lead to more
responsive and goal-oriented policies as well as more effective coordination
among administering agencies.6
On the other hand, since refugee problems are unique and complex,
planning may
...constrain innovative responses to what are essentially unpredictable crises...
A change in the ecological or political environments can make or break an
assistance program especially in Third World countries.'
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Two refugee programs discussed below serve to illustrate the nature of
UNHCR involvement in Costa Rica, as well as its limitations. One program
gave emergency assistance to Salvadoran refugees in a "paternalistic" fashion; the
other used a rural integration scheme inconsistent with Costa Rican conditions.
Emergency Assistance
Salvadoran refugees began arriving in Costa Rica in 1980, soon after the
UNHCR opened its regional headquarters in San Jose. According to a senior
UNHCR official a standard was set of "overprotecting" this first major refugee
group to come to Costa Rica.' The Salvadoran cause received much sympathy
from the refugee policy community; agencies not associated with the UNHCR
offered assistance. Project Counseling Service for Latin American Refugees,
funded by Europeans, and Diakonia, a Swedish agency, established offices in San
Jose. A support system was organized by Salvadorans; the Office for Assistance
to Salvadoran Refugees (OARS) offered health and educational programs and
cultural activities.'
From 1980 to 1983, the UNHCR distributed its cash assistance to urban
refugees through the Episcopal Church, the Costa Rican Red Cross, and then
through IMAS. Costa Rica restricted the employment of refugees and
encouraged instead that they develop income-generating projects. The National
Commission for Refugees (CONAPARE) stated during this period that refugees
should receive emergency assistance for 3-6 months, while projects were being
formulated.'4
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UNHCR assistance was continued, however. In 1983, many refugees had
been receiving emergency aid for three years. Although cash assistance offered
by the UNHCR was only enough for subsistence, many refugees received money
from more than one agency. Refugee families were said to receive more in
benefits than the average salaries of low-income Costa Rican families.' Some
also worked while continuing to receive assistance. Productive projects begun at
this time failed, in part, due to disincentives already ingrained by the aid. Fagen
argues:
Many of the refugees are more troubled by the psycho-social effect of three
years of dependence on public assistance than by the amount of that
assistance. The Salvadorans are characterized throughout Central America as
the hardest working group in the region, but in Costa Rica, apparently, the
dependence and consequent loss of self-esteem has, for many, eroded the
will to work and build for the future.'
These practices clearly went against policy outlined in the UNHCR
Handbook for Emergencies, namely, that assistance should be given in such a
way as to promote self-sufficiency.'
CONAPARE announced an abrupt change in January 1985: assistance
policy would be applied more strictly. Beginning October 1986, refugees then on
assistance and newcomers would have it discontinued after two months. 4
Nicaraguans, who were then arriving in massive numbers, charged that this shift
showed a bias against them." But UNHCR and CASP-Re officials insisted they
were trying to avoid earlier practices which created dependency. 6
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Rural Settlement
In 1980 the rural settlement of Los Angeles was established in northeastern
Costa Rica, intended for 1000 Salvadoran refugees. This agricultural project was
based on the classic UNHCR model predominantly used in Africa, where over
three million" (of the world's thirteen million) refugees reside. The goal is to
have refugees settle on uninhabited or sparsely populated land. They are assisted
in becoming self-sufficient by being provided with agricultural inputs and basic
social and physical infrastructure."
In Africa numerous countries have offered large tracts of land to settle
refugees of rural extraction. Hundreds of thousands have settled in Burundi,
Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, Zaire, and Zambia. During 1985 Tanzania
allowed 35,000 Burundian refugees to settle in its western highlands, in a large
agricultural project at Mishamo. 19 The prominence accorded rural settlements can
be seen in the 58 percent allocated for them in the UN-HCR's 1982 budget for
Africa. 2
The UNHCR chose to use this policy in Costa Rica, hoping the Los
Angeles farm would become a "model" project. Large amounts of money, time,
and labor were spent before it was realized the plan would not work. The
limited availability of land in Costa Rica imposed high costs, resulting in a
smaller size settlement and reduced economies of scale. High standards of
facilities required by the Costa Rican government also pushed up costs. 2 The
1980-81 UNHCR budget allocated $387,000 for Los Angeles, which never served
more than a few hundred people: the same year only $439,000 was allotted for
84
assisting close to 5000 refugees in San Jose.' The costs to settle one family in
Central America have been estimated at $10,000-$20,000, about three times more
than costs for settlement in Africa.23
Few studies were made before the great investment in Los Angeles. Only
20 hectares out of 196 were suitable for intensive crop production.' The
settlement was located in an isolated area with poor climate, and there were few
markets for products the refugees produced.2" Mismanagement and social factors
also contributed to Los Angeles' failure; the refugee population consisted mostly
of women, children, and elderly persons not able to operate a labor-intensive
agricultural project.26
BUDGETING
The UNHCR is not a development agency. As the two cases above have
illustrated, it cannot allocate large portions of its budget to research on
appropriate technology. The "crisis-and-relief" orientation of UNHCR assistance
makes programming for long term projects difficult, as budgets are constantly
being revised.
PVO officials in Costa Rica have pointed to inadequate and unpredictable
funding for camp operations as "the severest obstacle in maintaining steady
progress in the aid to refugees..."2  Table 4:3 provides information on camps.
The UNHCR makes a yearly budget for a country's operations. But the
"emergency" nature of refugee relief necessitates month-to-month revisions, as
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money is shifted around for different purposes. Projects often remain incomplete
when the UNHCR suddenly cuts off funds. The International Rescue Committee
(IRC), which administers the Achiote Active Center or "Centro Activo," reports:
Short term, much less long term, programming is impossible without a
secure and sufficient economic base from which to work, and it is in this
regard that the UNHCR's current funding policies have hindered the
acceptable development of assistance activities in the camp. Mid month
changes in crucial line items have the potential for leaving buildings
half-built, programs partially developed, and an overall stagnation of
progress. ...It has been impossible to project the operation of the camp
beyond a strictly routine, maintenance level -- a far cry from what one
would expect in a truly "Active Center" for refugees.
The absence of accountability which results from constant revisions of
budgets and unspecified objectives increases chances that UNHCR staff will cut
operational costs before administrative ones, a point often brought up by critics
outside the agency.
DIPLOMATIC STATUS
Through the resources it provides, the UNHCR can greatly influence how a
government will treat refugees. UNHCR officials in Costa Rica and around the
world persuade communities to accept refugees by financing clinics, schools, and
roads; while intended for refugees these can also benefit a wider area. The
community association at Boca de Arenal, for example, has reacted positively to
the refugees' presence. Their community center is rented to the UNHCR, and
local businesses have increased sales."
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But the UNHCR is limited in the amount of pressure it can exert on a
community or a host government to integrate refugees. Efforts to persuade the
community at Altamirita to open a refugee center in the summer of 1986 were
fruitless, despite incentives offered.0 The UNHCR could not react by threatening
to lessen or cut assistance as the European Economic Community (E E C) or
another state might. This would go against its mandate. In this sense, the
UNHCR lacks leverage on states.
PRIVATE VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS (PVOs)
The PVOs have been integral to the international refugee assistance system
that has evolved since the 1950's. They have gained esteem among development
agencies too, for their cost-effectiveness and success in fostering self-help
initiatives among the poor.
PVOs are non-profit agencies which provide services for overseas relief and
development; most commonly, they are formally independent of governments.
The term "PVO" is sometimes used broadly, however, to describe all types of
non-profit, service-oriented entities -- private and public, international and
domestic."
As non-governmental institutions, PVOs can presumably maintain apolitical
images; they are more likely to gain the acceptance of refugees and host
communities, and can act as intermediaries between the two. Because they work
on an individual level, PVOs are effective in building and bolstering community
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institutions. They are also freer from bureaucratic restrictions than U.N. and
government agencies, and thus are more likely to produce innovative projects.'
A study by the U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) of ten
large PVOs found that they incurred substantially less administrative overhead
than government-to-government aid programs: 3 to 7 percent of expenses versus
20 to 30 percent." One source of this difference is found in lower staff salaries.
Bolling and Smith state:
People who love their work and are driven by a high sense of mission often
work for less money than others less strongly motivated. PVO
administrative and field staff members are willing to work for less money
than their counterparts within AID and even those attached to host
governments who might otherwise receive AID grants.'
The capabilities of individual PVOs do vary significantly, as do their
agendas, values, and organizational philosophies.
In some cases, the politics of PVOs in refugee relief will extend to positions
of advocacy or to outright challenges to the policies and practices of donor
and host countries ...in addition to humanitarian motives that PVOs espouse,
they also have instincts for continued access to refugees, for growth, and for
self preservation."
But the potential contributions of PVOs to refugee assistance should not be
underrated. On the whole, they have proven to work effectively in areas where
governments cannot.
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PVOs IN COSTA RICAN REFUGEE AFFAIRS
The problems encountered with implementing assistance through the Costa
Rican government were outlined in Chapter 3. The government sought direct
control of refugee affairs which affected national security and economic issues.
It also wished to employ its own technicians and professionals. The Social
Assistance Institute (IMAS), a semi-autonomous government agency, distributed
emergency assistance, administered two camps, and oversaw productive projects
for refugees from 1982 to 1985.
General administrative deficiencies included:
1. Insufficient delegation of authority to PRIMAS, the refugee body within
IMAS.*
2. Excessive growth of the administrative bureaucracy without a
concomitant increase in professional staff.37
3. Extensive delays in the delivery of supplies (even basic foods) to
refugees in camps, exacerbating malnutrition."
4. Very little emphasis in social work programs on encouraging refugee
self-sufficiency.'
The embezzlement of $300,000 by low-level government officials in
PRIMAS ultimately proved the need for new refugee assistance agencies. The
UNHCR requested that these be private.
PVOs are humanitarian organizations that have a greater interest in problem
solving than large, lethargic bureaucratic organizations. Given limited policy
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direction and guidelines from the Costa Rican government, PVOs can play a
major role in meeting the basic needs of the refugees, and in fostering attitudes
and work habits that are conducive to a healthy adaptation to their host country.
PVOs can also influence the attitudes of refugee-affected communities.
While the UNHCR offers advice to governments on how to use refugee
assistance, the choice of implementing agencies is made by the host government.
A number of variables affect this decision, including the availability of qualified
national agencies. Political pressures also influence this decision; hence, contracts
may not be awarded to the most competent agencies.
The extended stay of the refugees in Costa Rica has called for PVOs able
to work beyond the emergency or relief stage, that is, agencies able to administer
long-term assistance and promote refugee self-sufficiency.
This requires a careful planning of operations and staff with technical,
managerial, and community development experience. Ability to work in
cross-cultural situations and to tolerate tough living conditions have also proven
to play an important role.' As one PVO director in Costa Rica emphasized, it is
difficult to find personnel willing to work in remote camp areas."
Three PVOs administer Costa Rica's rural refugee programs (see Table 4:3).
They are evaluated below, based on their strategies for refugee self-sufficiency
and their bureaucratic interests. The Costa Rican Red Cross and the Center for
Sociopolitical Analysis (CASP) are indigenous agencies and had little or no prior
experience in refugee work. The International Rescue Committee (IRC), a U.S.-
based PVO, has assisted refugees around the world for over fifty years.
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The Costa Rican Red Cross
The Costa Rican Red Cross was called on in the early stages of the refugee
influx; as its expertise was in emergency situations, it initially ran reception
centers along the border with Nicaragua. The Red Cross's role as an
"always-ready" and "quick-to-mobilize" relief agency42 poses the question of
whether it is qualified to administer long term assistance and promote refugee
self-sufficiency.
The Red Cross runs centers at Albaperal and Boca de Arenal, which may
have the worst camp conditions in Costa Rica. They have bad hygiene practices,
no preventive health care, and poorly planned housing with little ventilation."
Overcrowding and a constant inflow at these centers are beyond the Red Cross's
control; they were intended to be only "reception" centers where refugees would
remain for a brief period."
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Table 4:3
UNHCR - Funded Implementing Agencies in Costa Rica
(Rural Programs)
AGENCY REFUGEE
PROGRAM RESPONSIBILITIES POPULATION
1. CASP/CAMP Nicaraguan Implementation of Limon Tilaran
ladinos multipurpose assistance
creoles program: food, nutrition, 977 3041
miskitos housing, vater supply,
others education, counselling in
Limon and Tilaran camps.
2. COSTA RICAN Nicaraguan Same as above, for Alvaperal Boca
RED CROSS ladinos and Boca Arenal reception Alvaperal Arenal
centers.
1389 475
3. INTERNATIONAL Nicaraguan Active camps: Achiote Achiote
RESCUE ladinos 1. Food, nutrition, household
COMMITTEE (Also Miskitos in goods, health, environmental 2015
(IRC) future Playa Blanca health, housing and other
Project) constructions, water supply,
education and counselling.
2. Agriculture, cattle raising,
poultry keeping, beekeeping,
workshops, agriculture
projects outside camp,
employment out of camp.
3. Logistics.
Source: Regional Office, UNHCR, San Jose, Costa Rica, 30 June 1986.
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At Albaperal, Red Cross relief personnel work in teams at the various camp
activities. Their motto is to be the "jacks of all trades"; Red Cross workers, not
the refugees themselves, plan and construct refugee housing.45
The Costa Rican Red Cross assists victims of all types of disasters, natural
and man-made. Refugees are not the top priority within the work of this large
bureaucracy.
Center for Sociopolitical Analysis (CASP)
When the government agency PRIMAS was charged with embezzling funds
in 1984, the UNHCR asked that it be replaced by a private agency. CASP was
founded in 1985 by Costa Rican academics, social workers and other
professionals. It was hired in an effort to keep the largest refugee programs in
the hands of a Costa Rican organization. CASP-Re runs the urban refugee
program and CASP-CAMP the rural camps at Tilaran and Limon. CASP's
executive director, Gianina Tanzi, was an advisor to President Monge (1982-86).
Some members of CASP's staff belong to the National Liberation Party (PLN),
the ruling party since 1982, and are former employees of PRIMAS.46
Because CASP is closely tied with the government, it might not represent
the interests of the refugees objectively, and could be used to implement
restrictive policies. One diplomat in Costa Rica argued:
...CASP is oriented toward internal political goals and does not have the
values of a humanitarian agency. It uses instruments in a very bureaucratic
way, and has displayed little effort to promote creative solutions, such as the
teaching of 'survival tactics' to the refugees."
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CASP-CAMP, the rural project component of CASP, assumed administration
of the Tilaran and Limon camps after Socorro" left, in December 1985.
All administrative staff at the Limon camp are Red Cross personnel. The
camp director conditioned acceptance of his position on their selection."9 The
staff is cohesive and works separately from the refugees, according to a
CASP-CAMP study.5
International Rescue Committee
The International Rescue Committee (IRC) began administration of the
Achiote "active" center for Nicaraguan refugees in 1985. This private,
U.S.-based PVO was founded in 1933 as a refugee relief and resettlement
agency, and has worldwide experience. This experience is its major advantage
over the Costa Rican agencies. IRC's policy is to work with less than 10
percent overhead costs." It is the only refugee PVO in Costa Rica that finances
its own administrative costs (other agencies receive UNHCR funds for this.)"
IRC has also made an effort to hire locals: the IRC Representative in Costa
Rica and the director of Achiote are U.S. citizens; the rest of IRC's staff are
Costa Ricans.
Although IRC has also been basically an emergency/rescue PVO, it has a
strong policy of refugee self-reliance and has begun to alter its strategy to
operate in development situations.
At the Achiote "active" center, refugees participate in projects that promote
their self-sufficiency, and help offset the center's expenses. They receive
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technical aid and training in carpentry, farming, animal breeding, and other
activities.'
REFUGEE SELF-SUFFICIENCY
The UNHCR Handbook for Emergencies argues that refugees in camps will
reach self-sufficiency more quickly if PVOs allow them to run their own
community services. Regimented refugee camps should be avoided: the
assistance system should draw on the refugees' own methods for solving
problems.55
"Anti-participatory" strategies used in Costa Rica have already proven
ineffective and wasteful. The Los Angeles settlement for Salvadoran refugees is
cited in a UNHCR document for its poor record in this area. Under
administration by the Costa Rican Red Cross (1980-82), IMAS (1982-85) and
CASP (since 1985), refugees have assumed minimal management of the
settlement's activities:
There is no refugee committee or representation with whom project
management can discuss settlement matters. Refugees have not been
consulted nor been part of a decision-making process regarding settlement
planning and implementation. It was the implementing agency who decided
what to do, when and by whom. Refugee participation in actual settlement
implementation has been very limited. Many of the constructed facilities
are pre-fabricated and were set up by the implementing agency with the
help of local contractors. No refugees have been trained in management
and administration. Productive activities were initially done on a communal
basis. The people who were working in agriculture or other activities did
not receive any remuneration as the farm produce was sold by the
settlement management and the profits were reinvested in settlement
activities."
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The following describes general principles which should guide PVO social
work programs, and the degrees to which the agencies in Costa Rica follow
these.
The first principle, as stated in the UNHCR Handbook, is that refugees
should play the central role in a camp or settlement. The PVO administering
assistance should build on the refugees own resources to the extent possible."
The working philosophies of the Costa Rican Red Cross and the
International Rescue Committee (IRC) are divergent on this issue. Red Cross
workers (contracted by CASP-CAMP) at the Limon camp informally coordinate
the administration of activities among themselves. They have no meetings on
technical or social work matters and instead work cohesively and separately from
the refugees.' Refugees are not involved in maintenance, electrical or sanitary
tasks, for example. A group of Limon refugees found their communication with
Red Cross workers so poor, that they went to the U.S. Embassy in San Jose to
protest about camp policies.'
IRC staff encourage refugees to solve their own problems. IRC has tried to
make refugees as self-sufficient as possible by de-centralizing responsibilities
within the Achiote camp. Refugee groups distribute food, hygiene products and
domestic items. During a housing expansion that took place in 1986, refugees
received technical assistance and a small budget to design and build their own
family dwellings.''
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Social workers at Achiote have tried to delegate more and more
responsibility to refugees over the months. Refugee health promoters, for
example, are trained to encourage preventive health care -- a necessary element
given crowded camp conditions.'
A second principle stated in the UNHCR Handbook is that
familiarity with social values and customs is essential... Sympathy with and
understanding of the kinds of problems faced, and a knowledge of local
preferences for their resolution are essential. The importance of professional
impartial conduct cannot be overstressed.3
Refugee preferences -- on matters of diet or health care, for example -- can
be better understood if social workers conduct group, family, and individual
studies. IRC has done this to some extent at Achiote. Refugees have been
actively involved in decision-making on the kinds of goods and services used in
the camp. The administration has decided to work with UNHCR restrictions on
food, for example, in order to help refugees obtain the staples so important to
their diet: e.g., meat, "pinolillo" (a drink), beans and tortillas." IRC has sought
to accommodate opposition by refugee women to male obstetricians by searching
for female ones.65
Social workers at Achiote have also obtained valuable information on family
composition and vocational abilities of refugees. These detailed family files have
played a major role in the employment of men, women, and children in local
coffee harvests.'
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Such studies have not been conducted by Red Cross workers at the Limon
camp. The social worker has obtained no ethnic or cultural information on
which to base strategies for refugee involvement in the camp." The
administration has imposed its own authority and style of work without
understanding refugee organization and preferences.
Some Red Cross workers at Limon argue that refugees do not work because
they are "maladjusted" and aid-dependent; this should be changed, they say, via
regulation or sanctions."
PVO STRATEGIES AND HOST COMMUNITIES
A PVO can lessen community opposition to the refugees' presence. Friction
between Costa Ricans and Nicaraguans are common and have preceded the
opening of each new refugee camp." Many Costa Ricans believe Nicaraguans
have lower health and educational standards. They have feared also that
Nicaraguans settling nearby in large numbers will take jobs and strain social and
municipal services."
The more regimented camp life is and the more refugees are separated from
local communities, the greater the likelihood that refugees will be viewed as
"different," become scapegoats, and even the subjects of open hostility.
A PVO can foster positive relations between refugees and nationals by
encouraging commercial and social ties. Expenses on resources and materials for
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camps should be considered in socio-economic terms, not just budgetary ones:"
local materials and the skills of local people should be used whenever possible.
The Tilaran camp purchases its durable and perishable supplies each week
through the CASP-CAMP office in San Jose. CASP-CAMP has chosen to
centralize procurement in this way to avoid the stealing and waste of food that
occurred when Tilaran was administered by Socorro. In so doing, CASP-CAMP
has fallen into a trap, like PRIMAS did earlier. Deliveries have often been
delayed, causing refugees to go without certain foods and resulting ultimately in
malnutrition.'
IRC has made a conscious effort to purchase food and supplies from the
communities surrounding the Achiote camp. The people of Buenos Aires initially
were very opposed to the opening of this camp." Many have become accepting,
however, as refugees have stimulated depressed markets. Numerous farmers in
the area could not sell their vegetables or had to do so through an intermediary
because transport facilities to markets were poor. IRC's policy of buying from
locals has resulted in increased sales, and diversification and expansion of
production for some farmers who view Achiote's refugees as 2000 new
consumers.74 The camp benefits from the relationship because it can depend on a
supply of fresh vegetables.
IRC has cultivated community relations in other ways. It has sought to hire
its staff locally. The camp agronomist, for example, is from the region and is
helping refugee families resettle as sharecroppers or tenant farmers on local
farms. 5
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CONCLUSION
This chapter has studied the roles of non-governmental actors in refugee
integration. The UNHCR was created with a "crisis-and-relief' orientation that
makes planning for long term projects difficult. It is not a development agency
and hence cannot allocate large portions of its budget to research on appropriate
technology. In Costa Rica, the UNHCR assisted many Salvadoran refugees
ineffectively, and used an integration scheme inconsistent with Costa Rican
conditions.
UNHCR assistance lessens the burden of refugees on host countries and
may encourage governments to issue favorable asylum policies. But its power to
coerce governments to integrate refugees is limited.
PVOs have been found in many cases to better implement refugee assistance
than government agencies, because they tend to be more cost effective and
function with smaller staffs. PVOs are also freer of bureaucratic and political
restrictions and tend to be more strongly driven by humanitarian goals.
In Costa Rica, deficiencies in the government agency were rampant.
PRIMAS was slow in resolving problems and delivering supplies, its
administrative bureaucracy grew excessively, and some of its employees
embezzled assistance funds.
Three major PVOs now run Costa Rica's rural refugee programs. But only
the International Rescue Committee -- a private, foreign agency - actively
100
encourages refugee self-sufficiency, and promotes positive relations with host
communities. The Red Cross and CASP were chosen because the Costa Rican
government wished to maintain refugee programs in the hands of nationals. The
working philosophies of these two agencies have proven inadequate for the long
term administration of assistance.
The Red Cross has been involved in Costa Rica for many years but its
expertise is in emergency situations; its working style hinders the achievement of
durable solutions. CASP-CAMP, a new agency, is also lacking in solutions for
refugees. Some of CASP's staff are former employees of PRIMAS and are
members of the ruling party, the PLN. These ties could restrict the agency's
pursuit of an active integration program.
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Chapter 5
CONCLUSION
Chapter 2 of this thesis emphasized the changing nature of the world's
refugee problem. Today most of the world's thirteen million refugees have fled
ongoing conflicts in the Third World. Since they are increasingly shunned by
the United States and other Western nations, these refugees are likely to remain
in Third World countries, placing long-term burdens on already strained
resources.
As was shown in Chapter 2, massive numbers of Central Americans have
entered Costa Rica in recent years. While some flee the region's economic
chaos, many flee persecution and general warfare and are genuine "refugees." In
peaceful Costa Rica, refugees have found physical safety but little assurance
about their legal status or prospects for settlement.
Costa Rica has traditionally offered asylum to political dissidents, as it did
in the 1970's to persons fleeing Pinochet's Chile and Somoza's Nicaragua. But
they were relatively educated and few in number. Today Costa Rica faces a far
different task: providing services to tens of thousands of poor refugees who have
little formal education. The country's immigration laws are inadequate for such
mass asylum situations. Economic factors exacerbate the problem: Costa Rica
suffers high unemployment, uneven land tenure, rural poverty and substandard
housing.
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Chapter 3 discussed the role of the state in Costa Rican refugee affairs. In
keeping with its humanitarian practices, Costa Rica has accepted the refugees,
and declared that they be integrated into the society. One early goal of the
national refugee commission was to provide refugees with access to education
and health care, available to Costa Ricans through the welfare state. This
demonstrated the government's intention to prevent the development of an
underclass. But Costa Rica's welfare state is already overburdened, and
constantly operates with budget deficits. Unable to effect these policies with its
own resources, therefore, Costa Rica has relied on international aid.
While Costa Rica has defined and addressed the refugee problem over the
last decade, institutional changes have been slow. The government has spoken of
refugee integration, but actual policies have been determined by practical political
considerations, namely, that national interests are more important than
international commitments. Costa Rica's welfare state first meets the needs of its
own citizens, whose interests it has traditionally defended. Labor legislation and
norms on access to land and housing, for example, protect nationals but hinder
the integration of refugees.
The government is under pressure for jobs from its own citizens. Costa
Rican bureaucracy naturally tends to expand and distribute salaries to put off
discontent among growing educated classes. This tendency has been reproduced
in refugee programs, and in so doing the humanitarian purpose of refugee
assistance has been lost.
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Refugees in Costa Rica appear to have far better opportunities than in other
developing countries: education and health care services, for example, are the
most advanced in Central America. The degree to which they are able to take
advantage of these services, however, is not so clear.
Unlike the Honduran government, which has not involved itself directly in
refugee programs, leaving health and education projects to be implemented by
international agencies, the Costa Rican government has sought to play a dominant
role. A public agency which administered assistance from 1982 to 1985 was
inefficient and wasteful. IMAS was chosen in order to maintain refugee
programs in the hands of nationals, for security reasons, but also to employ the
country's technicians and professionals. IMAS was slow in making decisions and
delivering supplies, and its administrative bureaucracy grew excessively. The
government refugee commission, created to coordinate assistance efforts, has also
grown too much and been wasteful with UNHCR funds and other assistance. It
has failed, for example, to organize the work of the Ministry of Health, so
refugees at camps receive very poor medical attention.
Chapter 4 studied the part played by nongovernmental actors in integrating
the refugees into Costa Rican society. The United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees (UNHCR) seeks to protect the rights of refugees, and to promote
durable solutions to their problems (through voluntary repatriation, local
integration or resettlement in other countries). It offers advice on how to use
refugee assistance, but does not engage actively in operations. Assistance is
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implemented by the Costa Rican government and by private voluntary
organizations (PVOs).
The UNHCR has provided substantial assistance to Costa Rica, averaging $7
- $9 million per year. About 75 percent of this aid is used in short term relief
programs for refugees (see again Tables 4:1 and 4:2). The UNHCR does not
have the technical expertise needed to involve itself in large integration projects,
and lacks the political power to ensure their implementation.
As was found in Chapter 4, PVOs could play the strongest role in helping
refugees integrate. Because they are freer of bureaucratic and political
restrictions than government and UN agencies, they are more likely to produce
innovative projects. PVOs vary in their capacity to integrate according to their
different political, economic and social agendas.
Research has shown that refugees in camps will reach self-sufficiency more
quickly if PVOs pursue "participatory" strategies, which allow refugees to run
their own community services to the extent possible. The assistance system
should draw on the refugees own resources and methods for solving problems;
regimented refugee camps should be avoided.'
Refugees in camps are more likely to be accepted by host communities if
PVOs encourage commercial and social ties. A socioeconomic structure should
be created which encourages local purchases and self-reliance.2
In Costa Rica's rural refugee program, only the IRC, a foreign agency with
over 50 years experience in refugee work, has pursued policies that are favorable
to integration. IRC has encouraged commercial and social interaction between
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refugees and nationals and has promoted refugee self-sufficiency, despite the lack
of resources and direction from national policymakers. The working philosophies
of the two national agencies, the Red Cross and CASP-CAMP, have --
intentionally or not -- been less favorable to integration.
REVIEW OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The first research question asked how Costa Rica's liberal asylum policy is
affected by the enormous refugee influx. This study found the government's
need to be involved in all aspects of refugee assistance has overshadowed
commitment to a policy of refugee integration.
The Costa Rican state has sought to maintain firm control of refugee
programs. By delegating implementation of relief to government -- rather than
private -- agencies, the state has employed a large pool of Costa Rican
technicians and professionals and likewise maintained control over important
national security issues. In so doing, however, the state has lost sight of the
humanitarian purpose of this assistance, which has been dissipated in large,
lethargic bureaucracies.
The second research issue was the UNHCR's role in the integration process.
This agency's mandate is to provide assistance and promote long term solutions
to refugee situations. In the absence of other options, the UNHCR supported
"integration" of Central American refugees into Costa Rican society. Because of
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the "emergency" nature of refugee relief, however, it is difficult for the UNHCR
to program long term assistance. It is not a development agency.
The third question asked how the different political, economic, and social
agendas of PVOs affect their capacity to integrate the refugees. As the actions
of IMAS and CASP demonstrate, the stronger the identification of a refugee
agency with the Costa Rican government, the weaker was its pursuit of an
integration policy.
The state's role in so many aspects of Costa Rica's refugee programs made
it difficult to objectively analyze the policies of different PVOs. Because of
CASP's ties with the government, only two agencies -- the Red Cross and IRC --
could be evaluated on their strategies for refugee self-sufficiency and their
bureaucratic interests. It was difficult to distinguish, therefore, what made IRC
more effective than the Red Cross: IRC's experience working with refugees, or
the fact that it was a "foreign" PVO representing the interests of the refugee
within the host country.
My last research question involved the central theme of this thesis: the
degree to which refugee integration is effective, in light of the various interests
involved -- the refugees, the Costa Rican state, and the nongovernmental actors.
Costa Rica's integration policy has come into conflict with competing local
demands. The government may be restrictive in allowing refugees to work,
because it cannot afford to train foreigners for employment in a tight economy
that leaves many national workers unemployed.
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It is interesting to note, however, that other studies have demonstrated the
tendency of the Costa Rican government not to live up to stated social or
developmental goals. One example is its agrarian reform program. Two
autonomous institutions have been involved in agrarian reform -- the Institute for
Land and Colonization (ITCO), and IMAS, the antipoverty organization discussed
in this thesis (see Chapter 3). Seligson (1980) states that:
...both ITCO and IMAS have sometimes been more interested in enhancing
their own institutional image than in providing the impoverished peasant
with real help, while the major political parties pay only lip service to the
agrarian question. They mouth their agreement with the need for reform
(everybody claims to be in favor of reform) but the serious talk of politics
concerns other issues?
In another study, DeWitt (1977) discusses how the National Liberation Party
(PLN) addresses pressing social issues without taking concrete action:
Using reformist legislative or administrative agencies like ITCO, the
Agrarian Reform Agency, that will not solve the problem but will address
the issue, PLN has been able to gain popular support."
Delaying the implementation of integration policies might make the refugees
a greater burden for Costa Rica. The longer refugees are kept in camps the
more difficult it becomes to integrate them. Refugees do not work, their
productive spirits decline, and they may come to suffer from "dependency
syndrome" where they become too demanding and unwilling to take jobs for low
pay. When refugees are kept separate from local communities, political
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antagonisms are likely to occur between the groups. If given no viable
opportunities, the Nicaraguan refugees could damage neutral Costa Rica's
international image, as they will be more prone to involvement in Nicaragua's
counterrevolution.
It would be useful to study the possibility of having PVOs such as IRC
(whose integration strategies were found to be most effective) implement refugee
assistance in Costa Rica. The government may be wary of such agencies
because they interfere on its own realm. But the costs of having rural refugees
without employment and adequate health and educational services could be higher
than the costs of allowing foreign PVOs to run refugee programs.
Perhaps Costa Rica has favored short-term assistance over self-sufficiency
because the latter serves as a desincentive to repatriation. This question has been
highlighted in events subsequent to the research done on this thesis. When
President Oscar Arias proposed the Central American Peace Accord, signed by
the region's five presidents on the 7th of August 1987, one of the benefits he
envisioned was an end to Costa Rica's refugee problem.
Costa Rica's refugee policy shifted from "integration" to attacking the root
causes of the region's refugee flows. The Accord asked for national
reconciliation, cease fires, and democratization in each Central American country.
Point 8 requested that signatories provide assistance to refugees and begin
repatriation programs.
The Peace Plan increased cooperation between countries in the region but
did not sufficiently change conditions in refugees' home countries to encourage
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massive repatriation. Repatriation treaties signed by Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and
the UNHCR had limited success. The UNHCR hoped to repatriate some 500
Nicaraguans to their homes on the Atlantic Coast in 1988, but by midyear only
75 had returned.'
The number of documented refugees in Costa Rica fluctuated after 1986, but
not significantly. While many more immigrated, others may have left the
country or left the camps, making it difficult to keep track of them. During the
late 1980's refugee flows were actually increasing throughout Central America as
their principal causes were not amenable to change. Political and economic
repression was again on the rise.6 This means Costa Rica must still face the
question of whether it should seek to integrate the refugees; long range strategies
must be determined.
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
More independent studies are needed on the long-term problems of refugees
in developing countries. Little theoretical discussion exists in this area and there
is too much reliance on "in house" reports conducted by government and
international agencies.
Several aspects of the refugee problem in Costa Rica remain unclear and
require further research. Should refugees be incorporated into the economy
through income-generating, self-sufficiency projects or should they be integrated
into established industries, farms and cooperatives? Many self-sufficiency
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projects in Costa Rica have failed due to inadequate testing of markets and
refugee skills. Social factors affecting project success -- furthermore -- are often
not considered in proposals. For instance, the Palmar Sur project for Nicaraguan
refugees would have refugees working for payment in kind next to Costa Ricans
working for salaries.
In late 1985, the International Labor Organization (ILO) and the UNHCR
began a data bank on labor demand by industry. Matched by information on
refugee skills and characteristics, this urban program was said to have employed
1000 refugees by late 1986 in areas where local labor was not displaced. More
research is needed on this program and whether a similar program could succeed
in rural areas.
Refugee group organization and kinship ties could play significant roles in
the integration process and should be researched. (e.g. Salvadoran refugees in
Costa Rica are more highly organized politically than Nicaraguan refugees).
The problems of Costa Rica's urban refugees were touched upon lightly in
this thesis and should be the focus of other studies.
Research should also be done on the undocumented migrants in Costa Rica,
many of whom are "integrating" spontaneously. This work could focus on the
migrants' impact on labor markets: on whether they are an exploited class, and
whether they displace local labor. Another key question is what impact the
migrants have on health and educational standards. And, finally, whether it is in
the country's interest to control the actions of this group.
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Finally, given recent political changes in Nicaragua, one would wonder
whether refugees would begin returning in large numbers. If this were to occur,
research would be needed on the repatriation process. After many years of
refuge in Costa Rica, however, some Nicaraguans may choose not to return. The
interactions of the Costa Rican government with this group of "reluctant
returnees" would merit study.
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APPENDIX
FIELD INTERVIEWS
July 14-18, 1986
Gonzalo Retamal, Director, Social Programs, UNHCR
Patricia Drolet, Field Officer, Northern Region, UNHCR
Francisco Rojas Aravena, Professor, International Relations, National University
of Costa Rica
Jose Manuel Blanco, Direccion General para la Protecction y Asistencia a los
Refugiados, DIGEPARE
Fred Morris, Executive Director, Institute for Central American Studies; Editor,
MESOAMERICA
Nelson Sauci, Project Counseling Service for Latin American Refugees
July 21-25, 1986
Eduardo Palomino, World University Service of Canada
Demetrio Alvero, International Rescue Committee, IRC
Armando Vargas, Minister of Information and Communication during the Monge
Administration
Trip to Boca de Arenal and Alvaperal, 23 - 24 of July (Reception Centers in
Northern Costa Rica, administered by the Costa Rican Red Cross)
Patricia Drolet, UNHCR
Wilder Avellan Saldana, Camp Doctor
Arturo Maire, Red Cross, Accountant
Federico Paredes Valverde, Director, Refugee Program, Red Cross
Johnny Viques, Social Worker
15 Refugees
Elisa Alfaro Mata, Teacher, Alvaperal, PRODINREC
Alonso Badilla, Teacher, Boca de Arenal
Araceli Segura Retan, Asociacion de Boca de Arenal
Juan Fernandez, Owner Pulperia in Boca de Arenal
Carlos Denton, Consultora Interdisciplinaria de Desarrollo, Gallup Poll Service for
Costa Rica
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July 28 - August 1
Charlie Harrington, Political Officer, US Embassy
Jorge Rovira Mas, Director, Instituto de Investigaciones Sociales, University of
Costa Rica
Luis Guillermo Solis, Jefe de Gabinete, Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores
Padre Higinio Alas, Oficina de Orientacion y Asistencia Social a Refugiados,
OARS
Dr. Sherman Thomas, President, Socorro International; Vice Rector, Universidad
Estatal a Distancia
Trip to Achiote, Active Camp near Buenos Aires, Costa Rica, 31 of July through
1st of August (Administered by the International Rescue Committee)
Thomas Keables, Director of Achiote
Carmen Maria Orozco Molina, Nutritionist
Roman Montero, Assistant Administrator
Paula Busto Obando, Social Workrer
10 refugees
August 4-8, 1986
Sylvia Porras, Social Worker, Oficina de Orientacion y Asistencia Social a
Refugiados, OARS (Work with Salvadorans)
Anthonie Devries, Director, Refugee Program, European Economic Community
(Rural Employment Expert)
Jacques Meulmeester, European Economic Community (Urban Employment
Expert)
Mario Moreira, Attorney, OARS (Legal Aid)
Mario Guerra, Coordinator, Productive Projects, OARS
Ulises Otarola, Instituto Nacional de Aprendizaje
Mario Ramirez, Sociologist, Centro de Analysis Socio-Politico Para Refugiados,
CASP-RE (Administers Urban Program)
Carmen Maria Romero, Executive Director, CASP-CAMP (Administers Tilaran
and Limon Camps)
Amanda Carrizo, ILO-UNHCR Project (Searches for areas of the labor market
where refugees can be inserted)
August 11-15, 1986
Hilda Porras, former Director, CONAPARE
Antone Thybergin, Embassy of Holland (Playa Blanca Project for Miskito
Refugees)
Gale Nystrom, Worked with Salvadoran Refugees
Eliases Valverde, Universidad Para La Paz
Edelberto Torres Rivas, Secretary General, FLACSO
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Alejandro Solis, Deputy, PLN, Canton de Perez Zeledon (Regarding Playa Blanca
and Achiote)
Hugo Alfonso Muioz, Minister of Justice under President Monge
Alvaro Gonzalez, Ejecutivo Municipal, Ciudad Quesada, Canton de San Carlos
(where most refugees and undocumented migrants are)
Ricardo Araya, Presidente, Municipalidad Ciudad Quesada
Enrique Araya, Immigration Office, Ciudad Quesada
Trip to Limon Transit Center in Puerto Limon, 15 of August (Administered by
CASP-RE)
Mayor Madrigal, Guardia Rural
Flannigan Waggon Gonzalez, Miskito Refugee, on the Camp's Refugee
Committee
Katia Azofeifa, Secretary for Camp
Maritza Campos, Nutritionist
12 Refugees
August 18 - 22, 1986
Maritza Gutierrez, DIGEPARE
Amanda Carrizo, ILO-UNHCR Project Expert
Demetrio Alvero, IRC
Dr. Sherman Thomas, Socorro International
Nedy Zamora, CASP-RE
Jose Luis Vega Carballo, Professor of Political Science, University of Costa Rica
Luis Pal, Director, DIGEPARE
Jose M. Mendiluce, Chief Official, UNHCR, Costa Rica
Eduardo Palomino, World University Service of Canada, (Altamirita Project)
Gilbert Villalobos, Director, Immigration Office, Refugee Division
Gonzalo Retamal, Social Programs, UNHCR
Alejandro Chan, Legal Assistant, Durable Solutions Unit, CASP-RE
Liliana Rojas, Social Worker, El Productor (Projects for Salvadoran Refugees)
Martin Fernandez Borge, Manager, Melkis de Costa Rica, (Maquila-assembly
clothing industry that employs Nicaraguan and Salvadoran refugees)
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